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Carpenter v. United States 
16-402 
Ruling Below: United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). 
Carpenter and three other accomplices were charged with robbery and violating the Hobbs Act. 
As evidence, the state presented cell-site data gathered without a warrant. Carpenter moved to 
suppress the evidence on the ground that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights on the basis 
that the FBI should have acquired a warrant with probable cause prior to collecting said data. 
The Court denied his motion. Carpenter appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.  
Question Presented: Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cellphone records 
revealing the location and movements of a cellphone user over the course of 127 days is 
permitted by the Fourth Amendment. 
United States of America, 
v. 
Timothy Carpenter. 
 
United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit 
Decided on April 13, 2016 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. In Fourth 
Amendment cases the Supreme Court has 
long recognized a distinction between the 
content of a communication and the 
information necessary to convey it. Content, 
per this distinction, is protected under the 
Fourth Amendment, but routing information 
is not. Here, Timothy Carpenter and Timothy 
Sanders were convicted of nine armed 
robberies in violation of the Hobbs Act. The 
government’s evidence at trial included 
business records from the defendants’ 
wireless carriers, showing that each man used 
his cellphone within a half-mile to two miles 
of several robberies during the times the 
robberies occurred. The defendants argue 
that the government’s collection of those 
records constituted a warrantless search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. In 
making that argument, however, the 
defendants elide both the distinction 
described above and the difference between 
GPS tracking and the far less precise 
locational information that the government 
obtained here. We reject the defendants’ 
Fourth Amendment argument along with 
numerous others, and affirm the district 
court’s judgment.   
I.  
In April 2011, police arrested four men 
suspected of committing a string of armed 
robberies at Radio Shacks and T-Mobile 
stores in and around Detroit. One of the men 
confessed that the group had robbed nine 
different stores in Michigan and Ohio 
between December 2010 and March 2011, 
supported by a shifting ensemble of 15 other 
men who served as getaway drivers and 
lookouts. The robber who confessed to the 
crimes gave the FBI his own cellphone 
number and the numbers of other 
participants; the FBI then reviewed his call 
records to identify still more numbers that he 
had called around the time of the robberies.  
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In May and June 2011, the FBI applied for 
three orders from magistrate judges to obtain 
“transactional records” from various wireless 
carriers for 16 different phone numbers. As 
part of those applications, the FBI recited that 
these records included “[a]ll subscriber 
information, toll records and call detail 
records including listed and unlisted numbers 
dialed or otherwise transmitted to and from 
[the] target telephones from December 1, 
2010 to present[,]” as well as “cell site 
information for the target telephones at call 
origination and at call termination for 
incoming and outgoing calls[.]” The FBI also 
stated that these records would “provide 
evidence that Timothy Sanders, Timothy 
Carpenter and other known and unknown 
individuals” had violated the Hobbs Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1951. The magistrates granted the 
applications pursuant to the Stored 
Communications Act, under which the 
government may require the disclosure of 
certain telecommunications records when 
“specific and articulable facts show[] that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d).   
 
The government later charged Carpenter with 
six counts, and Sanders with two, of aiding 
and abetting robbery that affected interstate 
commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, and 
aiding and abetting the use or carriage of a 
firearm during a federal crime of 
violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 1951(a). 
Before trial, Carpenter and Sanders moved to 
suppress the government’s cell-site evidence 
on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that 
the records could be seized only with a 
warrant supported by probable cause. The 
district court denied the motion.   
 
At trial, seven accomplices testified that 
Carpenter organized most of the robberies 
and often supplied the guns. They also 
testified that Carpenter and his half-brother 
Sanders had served as lookouts during the 
robberies. According to these witnesses, 
Carpenter typically waited in a stolen car 
across the street from the targeted store. At 
his signal, the robbers entered the store, 
brandished their guns, herded customers and 
employees to the back, and ordered the 
employees to fill the robbers’ bags with new 
smartphones. After each robbery, the team 
met nearby to dispose of the guns and 
getaway vehicle and to sell the stolen 
phones.   
 
FBI agent Christopher Hess offered expert 
testimony regarding the cell-site data 
provided by Carpenter’s and Sanders’s 
wireless carriers, MetroPCS and T-Mobile. 
Hess explained that cellphones work by 
establishing a radio connection with nearby 
cell towers (or “cell sites”); that phones are 
constantly searching for the strongest signal 
from those towers; and that individual towers 
project different signals in each direction or 
“sector,” so that a cellphone located on the 
north side of a cell tower will use a different 
signal than a cellphone located on the south 
side of the same tower. Hess said that cell 
towers are typically spaced widely in rural 
areas, where a tower’s coverage might reach 
as far as 20 miles. In an urban area like 
Detroit, however, each cell site covers 
“typically anywhere from a half-mile to two 
miles.” He testified that wireless carriers 
typically log and store certain call-detail 
records of their customers’ calls, including 
the date, time, and length of each call; the 
phone numbers engaged on the call; and the 
cell sites where the call began and ended.   
With the cell-site data provided by 
Carpenter’s and Sanders’s wireless carriers, 
Hess created maps showing that Carpenter’s 
and Sanders’s phones were within a half-mile 
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to two miles of the location of each of the 
robberies around the time the robberies 
happened. Hess used MetroPCS call-detail 
records, for example, to show that Carpenter 
was within that proximity of a Detroit Radio 
Shack that was robbed around 10:35 a.m. on 
December 13, 2010. 
Specifically, MetroPCS records showed that 
at 10:24 a.m. Carpenter’s phone received a 
call that lasted about four minutes. At the 
start and end of the call, Carpenter’s phone 
drew its signal from MetroPCS tower 173, 
sectors 1 and 2, located southwest of the store 
and whose signals point northnortheast. After 
the robbery, Carpenter placed an eight-
minute call originating at tower 145, sector 3, 
located northeast of the store, its signal 
pointing southwest; when the call ended, 
Carpenter’s phone was receiving its signal 
from tower 164, sector 1, alongside Interstate 
94, north of the Radio 
Shack. See Carpenter App’x at 11. Hess 
provided similar analysis concerning the 
locations of Carpenter’s and Sanders’s 
phones at the time of a December 18, 2010 
robbery in Detroit; a March 4, 2011 robbery 
in Warren, Ohio; and an April 5, 2011 
robbery in Detroit. See Carpenter App’x at 
12-15.   
 
The jury convicted Carpenter and Sanders on 
all of the Hobbs Act counts and convicted 
Carpenter on all but one of the § 924(c) gun 
counts. Carpenter’s convictions on the § 
924(c) counts subjected him to four 
mandatory-minimum prison sentences of 25 
years, each to be served consecutively, 
leaving him with a Sentencing Guidelines 
range of 1,395 to 1,428 
months’ imprisonment. The district court 
sentenced Carpenter to 1,395 months’ 
imprisonment and Sanders to 170 months’ 
imprisonment. Carpenter and Sanders now 
appeal their convictions and sentences. 
  
II.  
 
A. 
  
Carpenter and Sanders challenge the district 
court’s denial of their motion to exclude their 
cell-site data from the evidence at trial. Those 
data themselves took the form of business 
records created and maintained by the 
defendants’ wireless carriers: when the 
defendants made or received calls with their 
cellphones, the phones sent a signal to the 
nearest cell-tower for the duration of the call; 
the providers then made records, for billing 
and other business purposes, showing which 
towers each defendant’s phone had signaled 
during each call. The government thereafter 
collected those records, and hence these cell-
site data, for a range of dates (127 days of 
records for Carpenter, 88 days for Sanders) 
encompassing the robberies at issue here. The 
government did so pursuant to a court order 
issued under the Stored Communications 
Act, which required the government to show 
“reasonable grounds” for believing that the 
records were “relevant and material to an 
ongoing investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
Carpenter and Sanders argue that the Fourth 
Amendment instead required the government 
to obtain a search warrant, pursuant to a 
showing of probable cause, before collecting 
the data. The district court rejected that 
argument, holding that the government’s 
collection of cell-site records created and 
maintained by defendants’ wireless carriers 
was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. We review the district court’s 
decision de novo. See United States v. Lee, 
793 F.3d 680, 684 (6th Cir. 2015).   
 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. “[F]or most of our history 
the Fourth Amendment was understood to 
embody a particular concern for government 
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trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects’) it enumerates.” United 
States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct 945, 950 (2012). 
Government trespasses upon those areas 
normally count as a search. Id. In Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), however, 
the Supreme Court moved beyond a 
property-based understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment, to protect certain expectations 
of privacy as well. To fall within these 
protections, an expectation of privacy must 
satisfy “a twofold requirement”: first, the 
person asserting it must “have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; 
and second, that expectation must “be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
When an expectation of privacy meets both 
of these requirements, government action 
that “invade[s]” the expectation normally 
counts as a search. Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 740 (1979).   
 
This case involves an asserted privacy 
interest in information related to personal 
communications. As to that kind of 
information, the federal courts have long 
recognized a core distinction: although the 
content of personal communications is 
private, the information necessary to get 
those communications from point A to point 
B is not. For example, in Ex parte Jackson, 
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878), the Court held that 
postal inspectors needed a search warrant to 
open letters and packages, but that the 
“outward form and weight” of those 
mailings— including, of course, the 
recipient’s name and physical address—was 
not constitutionally protected. Id. That was 
true even though that information could 
sometimes bring embarrassment: “In a small 
village, for instance, a young gentleman may 
not altogether desire that all the loungers 
around the store which contains the Post-
office shall be joking about the fair object of 
his affections.” Our Letters, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 12, 1872, at 4.  
 
In the twentieth century, the telephone call 
joined the letter as a standard form of 
communication. The law eventually 
followed, recognizing that police cannot 
eavesdrop on a phone call—even a phone call 
placed from a public phone booth—without a 
warrant. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-55. But 
again the Supreme Court distinguished 
between a communication’s content and the 
information necessary to send it. In Katz, the 
Court held that “[t]he Government’s 
activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words” was a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 
353 (emphasis added). But in Smith, the 
Court held that the police’s installation of a 
pen register—a device that tracked the phone 
numbers a person dialed from his home 
phone—was not a search because the caller 
could not reasonably expect those numbers to 
remain private. “Although [the caller’s] 
conduct may have been calculated to keep 
the contents of his conversation private, his 
conduct was not and could not have been 
calculated to preserve the privacy of the 
number he dialed.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 
(emphasis in original). Today, the same 
distinction applies to internet 
communications. The Fourth Amendment 
protects the content of the modern-day letter, 
the email. See United States v. Warshak, 631 
F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). But courts 
have not (yet, at least) extended those 
protections to the internet analogue to 
envelope markings, namely the metadata 
used to route internet communications, like 
sender and recipient addresses on an email, or 
IP addresses. See, e.g., United States v. 
Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 
2010); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 
1196, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th 
Cir. 2007).   
316 
  
 
The business records here fall on the 
unprotected side of this line. Those records 
say nothing about the content of any calls. 
Instead the records include routing 
information, which the wireless providers 
gathered in the ordinary course of business. 
Carriers necessarily track their customers’ 
phones across different cell-site sectors to 
connect and maintain their customers’ calls. 
And carriers keep records of these data to find 
weak spots in their network and to determine 
whether roaming charges apply, among other 
purposes. Thus, the cell-site data—like 
mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP 
addresses—are information that facilitate 
personal communications, rather than part of 
the content of those communications 
themselves. The government’s collection of 
business records containing these data 
therefore is not a search. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith confirms the point. 
At the outset, the Court observed that Smith 
could not claim that “his ‘property’ was 
invaded” by the State’s actions, which meant 
he could not claim any property-based 
protection under the Fourth Amendment. 
And as to privacy, the Court hewed precisely 
to the content-focused distinction that we 
make here. 442 U.S. at 741. The Court 
emphasized (literally) that the State’s pen 
register did “not acquire the contents of 
communications.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
Instead, the Court observed, the phone 
numbers acquired by the State had been 
dialed “as a means of establishing 
communication.” Id. Moreover, the Court 
pointedly refused to adopt anything like a 
“least sophisticated phone user” (to 
paraphrase the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act) standard in determining whether phone 
users know that they convey that information 
to the phone company: “All telephone users 
realize that they must ‘convey’ phone 
numbers to the telephone company, since it is 
through telephone company switching 
equipment that their calls are completed.” Id. 
at 742. The Court likewise charged 
“telephone users” with knowledge that “the 
phone company has facilities for recording” 
numerical information and that “the phone 
company does in fact record this information 
for a variety of legitimate business 
purposes.” Id. at 743. Thus, the Court held, 
Smith “voluntarily conveyed numerical 
information to the telephone company and 
‘exposed’ that information to its equipment 
in the ordinary course of business.” 442 U.S. 
at 744. Hence the numerical information was 
not protected under the Fourth Amendment.   
 
The same things are true as to the locational 
information here. The defendants of course 
lack any property interest in cell-site records 
created and maintained by their wireless 
carriers. More to the point, when the 
government obtained those records, it did 
“not acquire the contents of 
communications.” Id. at 741. Instead, the 
defendants’ cellphones signaled the nearest 
cell towers—thereby giving rise to the data 
obtained by the government here—solely “as 
a means of establishing communication.” Id. 
Moreover, any cellphone user who has seen 
her phone’s signal strength fluctuate must 
know that, when she places or receives a call, 
her phone “exposes” its location to the 
nearest cell tower and thus to the company 
that operates the tower. Accord United States 
v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(en banc); In re Application for Historical 
Cell Site Data, 724, F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 
2013). And any cellphone user who has paid 
“roaming” (i.e., out-of-network) charges—or 
even cellphone users who have not— should 
know that wireless carriers have “facilities 
for recording” locational information and that 
“the phone company does in fact record this 
information for a variety of legitimate 
business purposes.” Id. at 743. Thus, for the 
same reasons that Smith had no expectation 
of privacy in the numerical information at 
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issue there, the defendants have no such 
expectation in the locational information 
here. On this point, Smith is binding 
precedent.   
 
The defendants and their amicus, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, argue 
that Jones liberates us to hold otherwise. 
In Jones, five Justices (though not the Court 
in its majority opinion) agreed that “longer 
term GPS monitoring in government 
investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.” 132 S. Ct. at 964 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 
955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (same). But 
there are at least two problems with 
the defendants’ argument as made here. The 
first is that the government action in this case 
is very different from the government action 
in Jones. That distinction matters: in 
applying Katz, “it is important to begin by 
specifying precisely the nature of the state 
activity that is challenged.” Smith, 442 U.S. 
at 741 (emphasis added). Whether a 
defendant had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in certain information depends in part 
on what the government did to get it. A phone 
conversation is private when overheard by 
means of a wiretap; but that same 
conversation is unprotected if an agent is 
forced to overhear it while seated on a Delta 
flight. Similarly, information that is not 
particularly sensitive—say, the color of a 
suspect’s vehicle—might be protected if 
government agents broke into the suspect’s 
garage to get it. Yet information that is highly 
sensitive—say, all of a suspect’s credit-
charges over a three-month period—is not 
protected if the government gets that 
information through business records 
obtained per a subpoena. See United States 
v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 
1993).   
 
This case involves business records obtained 
from a third party, which can only diminish 
the defendants’ expectation of privacy in the 
information those records 
contain. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 443 (1976); Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1077-
78. Jones, in contrast, lands near the other 
end of the spectrum: there, government 
agents secretly attached a GPS device to the 
underside of Jones’s vehicle and then 
monitored his movements continuously for 
four weeks. That sort of government 
intrusion presents one set of Fourth 
Amendment questions; government 
collection of business records presents 
another. And the question presented here, as 
shown above, is answered by Smith.   
 
The second problem with the defendants’ 
reliance on Jones is that—unlike Jones—this 
is not a GPS-tracking case. GPS devices are 
accurate within about 50 feet, which is 
accurate enough to show that the target is 
located within an individual building. Data 
with that kind of accuracy might tell a story 
of trips to “the strip club, the criminal defense 
attorney, the by-the hour motel, the union 
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, 
the gay bar and on and on[.]” Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). But here 
the cell-site data cannot tell that story. 
Instead, per the undisputed testimony at trial, 
the data could do no better than locate the 
defendants’ cellphones within a 120- (or 
sometimes 60-) degree radial wedge 
extending between one-half mile and two 
miles in length. Which is to say the locational 
data here are accurate within a 3.5 million 
square-foot to 100 million square-foot area—
as much as 12,500 times less accurate than 
the GPS data in Jones. And cell phone 
locational data are even less precise in 
suburban and rural settings. Areas of this 
scale might encompass bridal stores and Bass 
Pro Shops, gay bars and straight ones, a 
Methodist church and the local mosque. The 
ACLU responds that so-called “femtocells” 
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can provide service (and thus identify a 
phone’s location) within areas as small as ten 
meters. But our task is to decide this case, not 
hypothetical ones; and in this case there are 
no femtocells to be found. The defendants’ 
argument is without merit.   
 
The defendants similarly rely on Riley v. 
California, 134 S.Ct 2473, 2485 (2014), 
where the Court held the government may not 
access a smartphone’s internal data—or, one 
might say, its contents—without a warrant. 
But the Court’s rationale was that 
smartphones typically store vast amounts of 
information about their users—vastly more, 
of course, than whether the user happens to 
be located within a two-mile radial 
wedge. Riley only illustrates the core 
distinction we make here.   
 
Some other points bear mention. One is that 
Congress has specifically legislated on the 
question before us today, and in doing so has 
struck the balance reflected in the Stored 
Communications Act. The Act stakes out a 
middle ground between full Fourth 
Amendment protection and no protection at 
all, requiring that the government show 
“reasonable grounds” but not “probable 
cause” to obtain the cell-site data at issue 
here. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). The 
defendants and the ACLU effectively ask us 
to declare that balance unconstitutional. 
There is considerable irony in that request. 
The Katz standard asks whether the 
defendants’ asserted expectation of privacy 
“is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize 
as reasonable[.]’” Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). Here, one 
might say that society itself—in the form of 
its elected representatives in Congress—has 
already struck a balance that it thinks 
reasonable. That is not to say that courts 
should defer to Congress’s judgment on 
constitutional questions. But when the 
question itself turns on society’s views, and 
society has in a meaningful way already 
expressed them, judges should bring a certain 
humility to the task of deciding whether those 
views are reasonable—lest judges “confuse 
their own expectations of privacy,” Jones, 
132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring), with 
those that every reasonable person must 
hold.  
 
A second point is related. Constitutional 
judgments typically rest in part on a set of 
empirical assumptions. When those 
assumptions concern subjects that judges 
know well—say, traffic stops—courts are 
well-equipped to make judgments that strike 
a reasonable balance among the competing 
interests at stake. See Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case For 
Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 863 (2004). 
But sometimes new technologies—say, the 
latest iterations of smartphones or social 
media—evolve at rates more common to 
superbugs than to large mammals. In those 
situations judges are less good at evaluating 
the empirical assumptions that underlie their 
constitutional judgments. Indeed the answers 
to those empirical questions might change as 
quickly as the technology itself does. With 
regard to the Katz test in particular, for 
example, “[d]ramatic technological change 
may lead to periods in which popular 
expectations are in flux and may ultimately 
produce significant changes in popular 
attitudes.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., 
concurring). Congress is usually better 
equipped than courts are to answer the 
empirical questions that such technologies 
present. Thus, “[w]hen technologies are new 
and their impact remains uncertain, statutory 
rules governing law enforcement powers will 
tend to be more sophisticated, 
comprehensive, forward-thinking, and 
flexible than rules created by the judicial 
branch.” Kerr, 102 Mich. L. Rev. at 859-60. 
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These concerns favor leaving undisturbed the 
Congressional judgment here.  
 
In sum, we hold that the government’s 
collection of business records containing 
cell-site data was not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  
 
B.  
 
Sanders argues that the district court should 
have suppressed the government’s cell-site 
evidence for another reason, namely that (in 
his view) the government’s applications to 
obtain the cell-site records failed to show 
“reasonable grounds” for believing that the 
records were “relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(d). There are several problems with that 
argument, but the simplest is that suppression 
of evidence is not among the remedies 
available under the Stored Communications 
Act. Quite the contrary: the statute identifies 
a handful of civil remedies, including 
“damages” and “equitable or declaratory 
relief,” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(b), and provides 
that those “are the only judicial remedies and 
sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of 
this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2708; see United 
States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th 
Cir. 2014). The relief that Sanders seeks is 
therefore unavailable under the 
Act. See United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 
556 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 
III.  
 
A.  
 
Carpenter argues that the district court erred 
when it denied Carpenter’s motion for 
acquittal for lack of venue over counts seven 
and eight. Those counts charged Carpenter 
with aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery 
in Warren, Ohio, and with aiding and abetting 
the use of a firearm in connection with that 
robbery. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 1951(a). 
We review the district court’s decision de 
novo. See United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 
667, 677 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 
Carpenter was prosecuted in the Eastern 
District of Michigan. Venue was proper there 
so long as a rational trier of fact, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, could find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that any of Carpenter’s 
accessorial acts, or the underlying crime 
itself, occurred in the Eastern District of 
Michigan. Relatedly, “[w]here venue is 
appropriate for the underlying crime of 
violence, so too it is for the § 924(c)(1) 
offense.” United States v. Rodriguez-
Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 282 (1999).  
 
Here, Carpenter’s accomplices testified that, 
while in the Eastern District of Michigan, 
Carpenter recruited the robbers for the 
Warren robbery, described for them the 
robbery’s general scheme, and from there 
drove them to Ohio. Two of these witnesses 
also testified that, while in Michigan, 
Carpenter made arrangements to have 
another accomplice supply the robbers with a 
gun when they got to Warren. A reasonable 
trier of fact could credit this testimony, and 
conclude that much of Carpenter’s conduct in 
abetting both the Warren robbery and the use 
of a firearm during it took place in the Eastern 
District of Michigan. The district court 
correctly denied Carpenter’s motion for 
acquittal on counts seven and eight.  
 
B.  
 
Carpenter argues that the district court should 
have allowed him to use a report prepared by 
FBI Special Agent Vicente Ruiz to refresh 
the memory of government witness Adriane 
Foster on cross-examination. We review that 
evidentiary ruling for an abuse of 
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discretion. See United States v. Morales, 687 
F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 
At trial, Carpenter’s counsel cross-examined 
Foster—an accomplice of Carpenter—about 
Foster’s past statements to Agent Ruiz. 
Foster testified that he told Ruiz that 
Carpenter had provided Foster with advance 
information about the robbery in Warren. 
According to Ruiz’s written summary of the 
interview, however, Foster told Ruiz that 
Sanders, not Carpenter, had provided Foster 
with advance information about the robbery. 
Carpenter’s counsel sought to introduce 
Ruiz’s report to “refresh [Foster’s] memory” 
of the interview.  
 
A document may be used to refresh a 
witness’s memory only after his memory has 
been “exhausted.” Rush v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 
399 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, 
Foster seemed to have no trouble 
remembering his conversation with Agent 
Ruiz. Foster repeatedly testified that he did 
remember telling Ruiz that Timothy 
Carpenter—not Timothy Sanders—had told 
him about the plans for the Warren robbery. 
Carpenter’s counsel then asked Foster 
whether he remembered “saying something 
different” to Ruiz. Foster said that he did not. 
That answer did not show that Foster’s 
memory needed refreshing; it showed that 
Foster disagreed with Carpenter about what 
Foster had told Ruiz. What Carpenter 
actually sought to do with the report was not 
refresh Ruiz’s memory, but impeach his 
testimony. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling that Carpenter could not 
use the report for that purpose.  
 
To the same end, Carpenter argues that the 
district court should have allowed him to 
introduce Ruiz’s report as extrinsic evidence 
of a prior inconsistent statement under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b). But an FBI 
agent’s written summary of an interview with 
a declarant cannot be used to impeach the 
declarant’s later testimony unless the 
declarant has attested to the report’s 
accuracy. See United States v. Barile, 286 
F.3d 749, 757 (4th Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1429 & n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1993). Foster has not done that here; to 
the contrary, Foster testified that Ruiz’s 
report would have been wrong if it said that 
Sanders rather than Carpenter had told him 
about the plans for the Warren robbery. The 
district court thus correctly barred the 
report’s introduction at trial.  
C.  
 
1.  
 
Carpenter’s remaining argument is that his 
1,395-month sentence is so disproportionate 
to his crimes as to violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment. He also argues that his 
mandatory-minimum sentences for his § 
924(c) convictions violate the constitutional 
separation of powers. We consider both 
issues de novo. See United States v. Kelsor, 
665 F.3d 684, 701 (6th Cir. 2011).  
 
“[O]nly an extreme disparity between crime 
and sentence offends the Eighth 
Amendment.” United States v. Odeneal, 517 
F.3d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 2008). In Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Supreme 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited a state court from sentencing to 
life imprisonment without parole a recidivist 
criminal who wrote a bad check for $100. But 
in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), 
the Supreme Court rejected the Eighth 
Amendment claim of a defendant who was 
sentenced to 25 years to life for stealing 
several golf clubs. 538 U.S. at 28-30.  
Carpenter has a long criminal history. In this 
case, as the district court observed, Carpenter 
organized and led several “very violent” 
robberies that put his victims “in extreme 
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danger[.]” Meanwhile, in other armed-
robbery cases, we have already held that 
sentences even longer than Carpenter’s were 
constitutionally permissible. See United 
States v. Clark, 634 F.3d 874, 877-78 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (2,269 months); United States v. 
Watkins, 509 F.3d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(1,772 months). Carpenter’s sentence does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment.  
 
Nor do his mandatory-minimum sentences 
violate the constitutional separation of 
powers. “Congress has the power to define 
criminal punishments without giving the 
courts any sentencing discretion.” Chapman 
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991). 
Carpenter acknowledges that we have “flatly 
rejected” his argument in other cases. 
Carpenter Br. at 54; see, e.g., United States v. 
Cecil, 615 F.3d 678, 696 (6th Cir. 2010). This 
case is no different.  
2.  
 
Sanders challenges his sentence on non-
constitutional grounds, arguing that the 
district court misapplied the Sentencing 
Guidelines and that his sentence is “greater 
than necessary” to accomplish the remedial 
objectives of incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. § 
3553. We review for clear error the district 
court’s factual findings in support of 
Sanders’s sentence, and review the sentence 
itself for an abuse of discretion. See United 
States v. Randolph, 794 F.3d 602, 614 (6th 
Cir. 2015).  
 
Sanders argues first that the district court 
incorrectly applied sentencing enhancements 
for brandishing or possessing a firearm in 
furtherance of robbery, and for physically 
restraining a person in furtherance of a 
robbery. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), 
(b)(4)(B). Sanders himself need not have 
committed those acts in order for the 
enhancements to apply; rather, he need only 
have known it was “reasonably probable” 
that a co-participant would commit 
them. See United States v. Woods, 604 F.3d 
286, 291 (6th Cir. 2010).  
 
That standard is met here. During the January 
7, 2011 robbery, Sanders’s 
accomplice Juston Young returned to the 
getaway car with gun in hand. Thus, when 
Sanders teamed up with Young and others for 
another robbery on March 4, Sanders could 
have easily foreseen that Young would 
brandish a firearm in the course of the 
crime—as in fact Young did. The district 
court did not clearly err in finding that the 
firearm enhancement applied to Sanders.  
 
Nor did the court err in finding that Sanders 
could foresee that Young would physically 
restrain someone during the March 4 robbery. 
As a general matter, an accomplice to robbery 
should foresee that robbery likely entails 
physical restraint or worse. See U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 cmt. 
n.2 (2012). And Sanders knew specifically 
that the plan for that robbery was for the 
robbers to move customers and employees to 
the back of the store. The physical-restraint 
enhancement was therefore proper. That 
leaves an enhancement for brandishing a 
firearm during the January 7 robbery. But 
that enhancement had no effect on Sanders’s 
Guidelines range: the offense level for the 
March 4 robbery was higher than the offense 
level for the January 7 robbery, even with the 
brandishing enhancement; and the offense 
level for the March 4 robbery, not the January 
7 one, thus determined his total offense 
level under the Guidelines. Any error as to 
the brandishing enhancement for the January 
7 robbery was therefore harmless. See United 
States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 574-76 (6th 
Cir. 2008).  
Finally, the district court acted within its 
discretion in sentencing Sanders to 170 
months’ imprisonment, which fell squarely 
within his Guidelines range of 151 to 188 
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months. Within Guidelines sentences are 
presumptively reasonable in this 
circuit. See United States v. Kamper, 748 
F.3d 728, 739-40 (6th Cir. 2014). Moreover, 
the district court considered and rejected the 
arguments that Sanders raised at his 
sentencing hearing, and otherwise properly 
determined that the sentence was appropriate 
in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court did 
not abuse its discretion.  
 
The judgments in both cases are affirmed.  
  
CONCURRENCE  
 
STRANCH, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join 
Parts II.B and III of the majority opinion, 
which resolve Carpenter’s and Sanders’s 
statutory, evidentiary, and sentencing claims. 
I concur only in the judgment with respect to 
Part II.A because I believe that the sheer 
quantity of sensitive information procured 
without a warrant in this case raises Fourth 
Amendment concerns of the type the 
Supreme Court and our circuit acknowledged 
in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring), and in United 
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 
2012). Though I write to address those 
concerns, particularly the nature of the tests 
we apply in this rapidly changing area of 
technology, I find it unnecessary to reach a 
definitive conclusion on the Fourth 
Amendment issue. I concur with the majority 
on the basis that were there a Fourth 
Amendment violation, I would hold that the 
district court’s denial of Carpenter and 
Sanders’s motion to suppress was 
nevertheless proper because some extension 
of the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule would be appropriate.  
A. Fourth Amendment 
Concerns  
 
At issue here is not whether the cell-site 
location information (CSLI) for Carpenter 
and Sanders could have been obtained under 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The 
question is whether it should have been 
sought through provisions of the SCA 
directing the government to obtain a warrant 
with a probable cause showing, 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(c)(1)(A), or a court order based on the 
specified “reasonable grounds[,]” id. §§ 
2703(c)(1)(B), (d). This leads us to the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  
 
Fourth Amendment law was complicated in 
the time of paper correspondence and land 
phone lines. The addition of cellular (not to 
mention internet) communication has left 
courts struggling to determine if (and how) 
existing tests apply or whether new tests 
should be framed. I am inclined to favor the 
latter approach for several reasons, 
particularly one suggested by Justice 
Sotomayor: “[I]t may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties. This approach is ill suited to the 
digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (citations omitted).  
 
It is easier to see why the existing tests 
present problems than it is to articulate a test 
that will not. This difficulty is exemplified by 
the two conceptual categories under the 
Fourth Amendment found in this case and the 
law that governs each. The majority 
accurately describes two different strains of 
law, one addressing the distinction between 
GPS tracking and the less accurate CSLI 
obtained and used in this case and the other 
“between the content of a communication 
and the information necessary to convey it.” 
(Majority Op. at 2.) To understand whether 
and how the tests established in these two 
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different strains of Fourth Amendment law 
might apply requires a brief review of each.  
 
First, the distinction between GPS tracking 
and CSLI acquisition. CSLI does appear to 
provide significantly less precise information 
about a person’s whereabouts than GPS and, 
consequently, I agree that a person’s privacy 
interest in the CSLI his or her cell phone 
generates may indeed be 
lesser. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail 
about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations.”); id. at 
963 (Alito, J., concurring) (“For older 
phones, the accuracy of the location 
information depends on the density of the 
tower network, but new ‘smart phones,’ 
which are equipped with a GPS device, 
permit more precise tracking.”).  
 
But precision is not the only variable with 
legal significance. In United States v. 
Skinner, we addressed the government’s use 
of GPS data emitted by a suspect’s cell phone 
to track the suspect’s whereabouts over the 
course of three days. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 
774–76. The tracking took place pursuant to 
a court order authorizing the suspect’s phone 
company to provide the government access to 
the GPS data emitted by the suspect’s pay-as-
you-go cell phone. See id. at 776. The 
majority opinion there acknowledged “the 
concern raised by Justice Alito’s concurrence 
in Jones” that long-term location monitoring 
in government investigations impinges on 
expectations of privacy, but held that the 
concern was not implicated in Skinner’s case 
because of the relatively short tracking 
period. Id. at 780. It distinguished Jones, 
explaining that “[w]hile Jones involved 
intensive monitoring over a 28-day period, 
here the DEA agents only tracked Skinner’s 
cell phone for three days. Such ‘relatively 
short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with 
expectations of privacy that our society has 
recognized as reasonable.’” Id. 
(quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring)). But Skinner framed this 
conclusion with a key caveat: “There may be 
situations where police, using otherwise legal 
methods, so comprehensively track a 
person’s activities that the very 
comprehensiveness of the tracking is 
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.” Id.  
 
Primarily analyzing this case under the tests 
established for the assertion of a privacy 
interest in business records, the majority here 
determines that the CSLI is unprotected 
because it deals with routing or conveying 
information, not the content of the related 
communications. (Majority Op. at 6–8.) This 
analysis reflects a valid distinction in that 
arena of the law. It is here, however, that my 
concern arises with the existing tests. It 
seems to me that our case resides at the 
intersection of the law governing tracking of 
personal location and the law governing 
privacy interests in business records. This 
case involves tracking physical location 
through cell towers and a personal phone, a 
device routinely carried on the individual’s 
person; it also involves the compelled 
provision of records that reflect such 
tracking. In light of the personal tracking 
concerns articulated in our precedent, I am 
not convinced that the situation before us can 
be addressed appropriately with a test 
primarily used to obtain business records 
such as credit card purchases—records that 
do not necessarily reflect personal location. 
And it seems to me that the business records 
test is ill suited to address the issues regarding 
personal location that are before us. I 
therefore return to the law governing 
location.  
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I begin by acknowledging that this case 
involves CSLI that does not reach the 
specificity of GPS. Nonetheless, Skinner 
recognizes “situations where police, using 
otherwise legal methods, so comprehensively 
track a person’s activities that the very 
comprehensiveness of the tracking is 
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.” Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780. The 
tracking of cell-phone data in this case went 
far beyond 3 or even 28 days—the 
government procured approximately 127 
days of CSLI records for Carpenter and 88 
days for Sanders. That is close to four and 
three months, respectively. Even taking into 
account the less precise nature of CSLI as 
compared to GPS, such extensive monitoring 
far exceeds the threshold we 
identified in Skinner and the warrantless 
acquisition of such substantial quantities of 
CSLI implicates the Skinner/Jones concerns. 
I do not think that treating the CSLI obtained 
as a “business record” and applying that test 
addresses our circuit’s stated concern 
regarding long-term, comprehensive tracking 
of an individual’s location without a warrant. 
At issue here is neither relatively innocuous 
routing information nor precise GPS locator 
information: it is personal location 
information that partakes of both. I am also 
concerned about the applicability of a test 
that appears to admit to no limitation on the 
quantity of records or the length of time for 
which such records may be compelled. I 
conclude that our precedent suggests the need 
to develop a new test to determine when a 
warrant may be necessary under these or 
comparable circumstances.  
 
B. The Exclusionary Rule & 
Good-Faith Exception  
“When evidence is obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
judicially developed exclusionary rule 
usually precludes its use in a criminal 
proceeding against the victim of the illegal 
search and seizure.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 
U.S. 340, 347 (1987). The exclusionary rule 
is not intended “to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the search victim[.] . . . Instead, the 
rule’s prime purpose is to deter future 
unlawful police conduct and thereby 
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches 
and seizures[.]” United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). “As with any 
remedial device, application of the 
exclusionary rule properly has been restricted 
to those situations in which its remedial 
purpose is effectively advanced.” Krull, 480 
U.S. at 347.  
 
This restriction has led the Supreme Court to 
articulate certain “exceptions” to the 
exclusionary rule. For example, in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the 
Supreme Court held that courts generally 
should not apply the exclusionary rule to 
evidence obtained by police officers whose 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate was objectively 
reasonable, even if the warrant was 
ultimately found to be defective. See Leon, 
468 U.S. at 905– 26; see also id. at 926 (“In 
the absence of an allegation that the 
magistrate abandoned his detached and 
neutral role, suppression is appropriate only 
if the officers were dishonest or reckless in 
preparing their affidavit or could not have 
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in 
the existence of probable cause.”). The Court 
explained that “when an officer acting with 
objective good faith has obtained a search 
warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted 
within its scope[,]” “[p]enalizing the officer 
for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, 
cannot logically contribute to the deterrence 
of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. at 
920–21 (footnote omitted). In Illinois 
v. Krull, the Supreme Court extended the 
good-faith exception articulated in Leon to 
325 
  
evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on a 
statute that is subsequently declared 
unconstitutional, reasoning “that the greatest 
deterrent to the enactment of unconstitutional 
statutes by a legislature is the power of the 
courts to invalidate such statutes.” Krull, 480 
U.S. at 352; see also id. at 349–350.  
 
In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest 
that the FBI agents who obtained the CSLI of 
Carpenter and Sanders pursuant to the SCA 
engaged in any intentional misconduct. 
Suppressing the CSLI at trial would not have 
the requisite deterrent effect on future 
unlawful conduct and application of the 
exclusionary rule is therefore 
inappropriate. See, e.g., United States 
v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 333–34 (6th Cir. 
2010) (Keith, J., concurring). Assuming 
without deciding that this situation states a 
Fourth Amendment violation, I would still 
affirm the district court’s denial of Carpenter 
and Sanders’s motion to suppress on this 
ground.  
 
C. Judicial Review  
 
One further issue of importance bears 
mentioning. The majority may be correct that 
Congress is well positioned to gauge 
changing public attitudes toward new and 
evolving technology. This institutional 
advantage may even weigh in favor of 
approaching challenges to statutes that 
balance privacy and public safety interests 
with some caution. But I do not see this case 
primarily as a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the SCA’s provisions that 
authorize the government to seek secured 
communications through either an order or a 
warrant. The question before us is one that 
courts routinely answer: did the search at 
issue require a warrant? That the government 
sought and obtained an order under the SCA 
does not immunize that order from challenge 
on Fourth Amendment grounds. As relevant 
here, our circuit has already had occasion to 
weigh the propriety of an order under the 
SCA and to have found that order 
wanting. Warshak explained that “to the 
extent that the SCA purports to permit the 
government to obtain [a subscriber’s] emails 
[from an internet service provider] 
warrantlessly, the SCA is 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 288. I do not read 
that holding as declaring the balance struck 
by the SCA unconstitutional. (See Majority 
Op. at 10–11.) Warshak simply found that 
one proposed interpretation or use of the 
SCA as applied did not comply with the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement for a 
warrant based on probable cause. 
Determining the parameters of the Fourth 
Amendment is the task of the 
judiciary. See United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (quoting Zivotofsky 
v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012)). The 
runaway pace of technological development 
makes this task more difficult. But the job is 
ours nonetheless and the circumstances 
before us lead me to believe that we have 
more work to do to determine the best 
methods for assessing the application of the 
Fourth Amendment in the context of new 
technology.  
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“U.S. Supreme Court to settle major cellphone privacy case” 
 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
June 5, 2017 
 
Police officers for the first time could be 
required to obtain warrants to get data on the 
past locations of criminal suspects based on 
cellphone use under a major case on privacy 
rights in the digital age taken up by the U.S. 
Supreme Court on Monday. 
The justices agreed to hear an appeal by a 
man convicted in a series of armed robberies 
in Ohio and Michigan with the help of past 
cellphone location data who contends that 
without a warrant from a court such data 
amounts to an unreasonable search and 
seizure under the U.S. Constitution's Fourth 
Amendment. 
Cellphone location records are becoming 
increasingly important to police in criminal 
investigations, with authorities routinely 
requesting and receiving this information 
from wireless providers. 
Police helped establish that the man at the 
center of the case, Timothy Carpenter, was 
near the scene of the robberies at Radio Shack 
and T-Mobile stores by securing past "cell 
site location information" from his cellphone 
carrier that tracked which local cellphone 
towers relayed his calls. 
The case reaches the high court amid growing 
scrutiny of the surveillance practices of U.S. 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
amid concern among lawmakers across the 
political spectrum about civil liberties and 
police evading warrant requirements. 
The legal fight has raised questions about 
how much companies protect the privacy 
rights of their customers. The big four 
wireless carriers, Verizon Communications 
Inc(VZ.N), AT&T Inc(T.N), T-Mobile US 
Inc(TMUS.O) and Sprint Corp(S.N), receive 
tens of thousands of requests a year from law 
enforcement for what is known as "cell site 
location information," or CSLI. The requests 
are routinely granted. 
The Supreme Court has twice in recent years 
ruled on major cases concerning how 
criminal law applies to new technology, on 
each occasion ruling against law 
enforcement. In 2012, the court held that a 
warrant is required to place a GPS tracking 
device on a vehicle. Two years later, the court 
said police need a warrant to search a 
cellphone that is seized during an arrest. 
The information that law enforcement 
agencies can obtain from wireless carriers 
shows which local cellphone towers users 
connect to at the time they make calls. Police 
can use historical data to determine if a 
suspect was in the vicinity of a crime scene 
or real-time data to track a suspect. 
Carpenter's bid to suppress the evidence 
failed and he was convicted of six robbery 
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counts. On appeal, the Cincinnati, Ohio-
based 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld his convictions, finding that no 
warrant was required for the cellphone 
information. 
Civil liberties lawyers have said that police 
need "probable cause," and therefore a 
warrant, in order to avoid constitutionally 
unreasonable searches. 
'LONGSTANDING PROTECTIONS' 
A general view of the U.S. Supreme Court 
building in Washington, U.S., November 15, 
2016.Carlos Barria 
"Because cellphone location records can 
reveal countless private details of our lives, 
police should only be able to access them by 
getting a warrant based on probable cause," 
said Nathan Freed Wessler, a staff attorney 
with the American Civil Liberty Union's 
Speech, Privacy and Technology Project who 
represents Carpenter. 
"The time has come for the Supreme Court to 
make clear that the longstanding protections 
of the Fourth Amendment apply with 
undiminished force to these kinds of sensitive 
digital records," Wessler added. 
But, based on a provision of a 1986 federal 
law called the Stored Communications Act, 
the government said it does not need probable 
cause to obtain customer records. Instead, the 
government said, prosecutors must show 
only that there are "reasonable grounds" for 
the records and that they are "relevant and 
material" to an investigation. 
The case will be heard and decided in the 
court's next term, which starts in October and 
ends in June 2018. 
The Trump administration said in court 
papers the government has a "compelling 
interest" for acquiring the records without a 
warrant because the information is 
particularly useful at the early stage of a 
criminal investigation. 
"Society has a strong interest in both 
promptly apprehending criminals and 
exonerating innocent suspects as early as 
possible during an investigation," the 
administration said in a brief. 
David LaBahn, president of the Association 
of Prosecuting Attorneys, said warrants can 
be obtained quickly from judges but police 
may have problems getting the evidence 
needed to show probable cause. 
"They may not be able to get over that legal 
hurdle, so the court couldn't issue the 
warrant," LaBahn said. 
Civil liberties groups assert that the 1986 law 
did not anticipate the way mobile devices 
now contain a wealth of data on each user. 
Steve Vladeck, a national security and 
constitutional law professor at the University 
of Texas, said the case will have "enormous 
implications" over how much data the 
government can obtain from phone 
companies and other technology firms about 
their customers without a warrant. 
"Courts and commentators have tried to 
figure out exactly when individuals will have 
a continuing expectation of privacy even in 
data they've voluntarily shared with a third 
party," Vladeck said. "This case squarely 
raises that question." 
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“Digital Privacy to Come Under Supreme Court’s Scrutiny” 
 
The New York Times 
Peter J. Henning 
July 10, 2017 
 
In October 1986, the top-rated television 
program was “The Cosby Show,” Janet 
Jackson’s “When I Think of You” headed the 
pop music charts and “Crocodile Dundee” 
dominated the box office. 
Congress, meanwhile, passed an obscure 
statute that month called the Stored 
Communications Act that has become much 
more relevant 30 years later as the Supreme 
Court will have two opportunities to help 
define the scope of digital privacy under a 
law enacted when cellphones and email 
hardly existed. 
To obtain electronic communications, the 
government must obtain a warrant for any 
that are held for 180 days or fewer by a 
computer service provider. This means 
establishing probable cause that the evidence 
sought is related to a crime. 
But for anything older than that, investigators 
need only a grand jury or administrative 
subpoena, as long as the person whose 
communications are sought is informed. That 
notification can be delayed by as much as 90 
days if disclosure might have an adverse 
effect, such as destroying or tampering with 
evidence. 
Back in 1986, Congress viewed 
communications over six months old to be 
abandoned and therefore subject to reduced 
protection, a notion that looks quaint today 
when emails and texts may be held for years. 
Another provision of the statute allows 
investigators to obtain information from the 
provider about a subscriber to any electronic 
service, like cellphones, by seeking a court 
order based on “reasonable grounds to 
believe” that the records are relevant to a 
criminal investigation. This is a lower 
standard than probable cause, the usual 
requirement for a search warrant. 
It is this lower threshold for getting 
information that is at issue in Carpenter v. 
United States, which the Supreme Court will 
hear in its next term starting in October. 
The defendants were convicted of organizing 
a string of robberies in the Detroit area where 
they served as lookouts by parking near the 
stores. The government obtained orders 
directing wireless carriers to provide cell site 
location information showing where different 
numbers linked to the crew conducting the 
robberies were at the time of the crimes. 
Armed with data from various cell towers, 
prosecutors showed at trial that the 
defendants’ phones were a half-mile to two 
miles from the robberies, helping to link them 
to the actual perpetrators. 
The defendants sought to suppress that 
information, arguing that it constituted a 
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search of their phones so that the reasonable 
grounds standard in the Stored 
Communications Act for the order did not 
meet the probable cause requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati rejected that 
claim, finding that “although the content of 
personal communications is private, the 
information necessary to get those 
communications from point A to point B is 
not.” Therefore, the defendants had no 
privacy interest in the information held by the 
carriers about their location and the 
constitutional probable cause requirement 
did not apply. 
The Carpenter case raises a fundamental 
question about how far the privacy protection 
in the Fourth Amendment, which by its terms 
applies to “persons, houses, papers and 
effects,” should reach in protecting data 
generated by a person’s electronic devices. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote in 
Riley v. California, a 2014 decision, that 
cellphones are now “such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial 
visitor from Mars might conclude they were 
an important feature of human anatomy.” 
In Riley, the court found that a warrantless 
search of an arrestee’s cellphone was 
unconstitutional, explaining that what 
distinguishes the device from other items that 
might be found on a person that the police 
could look at “is their immense storage 
capacity.” But rummaging through the 
contents of a phone or computer is not 
necessarily the same as getting site 
information that is broadcast to the carrier, 
especially when a person may enable it by 
using an app like Find My Phone. 
In a 2012 case, United States v. Jones, the 
Supreme Court found that the use of a GPS 
tracker attached to a car was a search 
governed by the Fourth Amendment. Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor explained in a concurring 
opinion that the privacy interests in a 
person’s specific location required 
investigators to get a warrant because 
gathering that information “enables the 
government to ascertain, more or less at will, 
their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.” 
In the Carpenter case, the justices will have 
to weigh whether cell site data is different 
from a GPS tracker because learning where a 
person is within about a one-mile radius may 
not be a sufficient invasion of privacy to 
come within the Fourth Amendment. Nor 
does obtaining the location of a cellphone 
reveal the content of any communication, 
only that a call was made, so the protection 
afforded by the Riley decision may not apply. 
Another case involving the Stored 
Communications Act that may come before 
the justices concerns the territorial reach of a 
warrant authorizing investigators to obtain 
emails held by Microsoft. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Manhattan, in Microsoft v. United States, 
found that the warrant did not apply to emails 
stored on a server in Dublin because there 
was no indication in the statute that Congress 
intended to authorize a search outside the 
United States. 
The Justice Department filed a petition with 
the Supreme Court on June 22 asking for a 
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review of that decision, arguing that it was 
“wrong, inconsistent with this court’s 
framework for analysis of extraterritoriality 
issues, and highly detrimental to criminal law 
enforcement.” Those requests are often 
granted because the justices rely on the 
solicitor general’s office to identify cases that 
have significant law enforcement 
implications. 
Another factor in favor of granting review is 
that the Second Circuit’s decision has not 
been followed by federal district courts in 
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington and 
Wisconsin, which have enforced warrants to 
produce email records that may have been 
stored abroad. A note in the Harvard Law 
Review criticized the decision because it “did 
not acknowledge the ‘un-territorial’ nature of 
data.” 
Microsoft is fighting the effort to apply the 
Stored Communications Act to electronic 
records held outside the United States, 
pointing out in a company blog post that the 
European Union’s new General Data 
Protection Regulation scheduled to go into 
effect next year will make it illegal to transfer 
customer data from Europe to the United 
States. That could put global technology 
organizations like Google and Microsoft in 
the difficult position of balancing demands 
for greater privacy with efforts to investigate 
crime that could result in large fines for 
failure to comply. 
Determining how digital information fits 
under a constitutional protection adopted 
when there were only “persons, homes, 
papers and effects” that could be searched 
requires the Supreme Court to figure out the 
scope of privacy expectations in a very 
different world from the 18th century. The 
problem is that legal challenges take a 
piecemeal approach to a statute adopted over 
30 years ago, and the courts cannot rewrite 
provisions that may be hopelessly out of date. 
The House of Representatives adopted the 
Email Privacy Act in February to modernize 
the protections afforded electronic 
communications that would require obtaining 
a search warrant in almost every case. That 
proposal met resistance in the Senate last year 
when Attorney General Jeff Sessions, then a 
senator from Alabama, sought to add a 
provision allowing law enforcement to skip 
the warrant requirement in emergency 
situations. 
Whether the legislation can get through the 
Senate is an open question, and it is not clear 
whether President Trump would sign off if 
the Justice Department opposes the bill. That 
may mean the Supreme Court will have to 
establish the broad parameters of digital 
privacy while Congress tries to deal with the 
intricacies of a world of electronic 
communication that evolves rapidly. 
Devices connected to the internet, from 
cellphones to watches to personal training 
trackers that facilitate our personal habits and 
communications, are a fact of daily life, and 
the Supreme Court will have to start drawing 
clear lines around what types of electronic 
information are — and are not — protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. Simply asserting 
that there is a right to privacy does not 
provide much help in determining how far 
that protection should extend in a digital 
world. 
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“Cell phone privacy case of Michigan criminal goes to U.S. Supreme 
Court” 
 
FOX 2- Detroit Local News 
Taryn Asher 
June 5, 2017 
 
A metro Detroit area man is convicted in a 
series of armed robberies in Michigan and 
Ohio - but his right to cell phone privacy 
could wipe that out. 
He is appealing because of how police got 
ahold of cell phone records used to make the 
case against him - now the US Supreme Court 
will weigh in. 
Timothy Carpenter will spend the next 116 
years in federal prison - but this case could 
reverse that decision. 
"Cell phones were probably the size of a 
brick at that time, things have changed a great 
deal," said attorney Harold Gurewitz. 
Well-known defense attorney Harold 
Gurewitz along with the ACLU says that it is 
time the law changes too. 
On Monday the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
to hear a landmark case that could change 
how law enforcement obtains cell phone 
location records. 
Gurewitz says technology has evolved and 
advanced since the 1986 Stored 
Communication Act - which says the 
government does not to show probable cause 
to get customer cell phone records. 
"People have cell phones with them all the 
time, use them for all the details of their lives 
without knowing the records of how or when 
they use their phones could become available 
by the government," Gurewitz said. 
All of this stems from a 2011 federal case 
Gurewitz defended when his client, 32 -year-
old Timothy Carpenter, was convicted for 
robbing several cell phone stores in Michigan 
and one in Ohio, sent to prison for the rest of 
his life.  
Coincidentally, federal investigators 
obtained months’ worth of cell phone 
location records which helped show where 
Carpenter was when he made and received 
calls in the general area of the robberies. 
That evidence helped lead to his conviction - 
evidence Gurewitz says was obtained without 
a search warrant. 
"It is our position the evidence shouldn't have 
been used at trial and if it had an impact on 
the trial," he said. "If it was material and 
harmful then it should result in reversal of his 
conviction." 
At trial, prosecutors said Carpenter organized 
many of the robberies supplied the firearms 
and acted as the look out, but Gurewitz says 
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that's not what this supreme court case is 
about. 
"What this case is really about is whether 
people have a right to privacy in records that 
are created with cell phones," he said.
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“This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still Doesn't Require a 
Warrant” 
 
The Atlantic 
Robinson Meyer 
April 14, 2016 
 
The government does not need a warrant to 
access the location data created on an 
ordinary, often minute-to-minute basis by 
cellphones and logged with cell providers, 
the Sixth Circuit for the U.S. Court of 
Appeals ruled Wednesday. 
The ruling adds to a growing consensus 
among federal appeals courts that law 
enforcement can request this type of data—
called “cell-site location information,” or 
CSLI—without violating the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable search or seizure. But it only 
complicates the legal situation of their use, 
which is now so complex that driving across 
the border from Illinois to Kentucky changes 
how federal authorities can use the 
technology. 
Every time a cellphone checks in with its 
provider—to send a text message, to start or 
end a voice call, or just to get a push 
notification—it lodges a time-stamped piece 
of location information with the nearest cell 
tower. This data, CSLI, isn’t as precise as a 
GPS coordinate, but in urban or suburban 
areas it can narrow someone’s location down 
to less than two miles and give their angular 
relationship to the nearest cell tower. String a 
set of these time-stamped points together and 
you can disprove an alibi or reconstruct an 
escape route. 
Right now, CSLI comes in three flavors. The 
first is “real-time,” where police work with a 
cell provider to access location data 
immediately after it’s created. This usually 
does require a warrant. The second is a 
“tower dump,” when authorities ask for all 
the phones that have communicated with a 
certain tower during a period of time. There’s 
not a lot of law about how tower dumps work, 
but as of September of last year cops rarely 
sought a warrant for them.   
The third is historical CSLI, where law 
enforcement requests a backlog of location 
data created by a certain phone. This does not 
require a warrant, and hundreds of these 
requests happen per day. In 2015, AT&T 
alone handled more than 58,000 requests for 
historic CSLI. (By contrast, it received about 
17,000 real-time CSLI warrants and fewer 
than 1,500 tower-dump requests.) 
Warrantless CSLI may be the most common 
kind of cellphone surveillance that 
Americans are subject to. 
The just-decided Sixth Circuit case, U.S. v. 
Carpenter and Sanders, is a good example of 
how this looks in practice. Between 
December 2010 and March 2011, there were 
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a string of robberies of T-Mobile and 
Radioshack stores in and around Detroit. The 
robber, not named in the suit, confessed soon 
after the crimes and shared his cellphone 
number with the FBI. The agency requested 
his call records, then made a second request: 
the call records and cell-site location 
information for 16 additional phone numbers. 
With this data, it identified the defendants in 
the suit—Timothy Sanders and Timothy 
Carpenter—as the alleged organizers, 
getaway car drivers, and lookout men for the 
robberies. 
In making this critical second request, it 
asked for more than just a couple of days of 
location data. In fact, it asked for more than 
215 days of combined CSLI, almost seven 
months of information total. The defendants 
and the American Civil Liberties Union 
contended that all this geographical data, 
when taken together, constituted a 
warrantless search.    
“When police obtain months’ worth of 
cellphone data comprising thousands of 
individual locations, like they did in this case, 
they should have to get a search warrant from 
a judge,” said Nathan Freed Wessler, the 
ACLU attorney who argued the case in front 
of the Sixth Circuit, in a statement. 
The ACLU turned to two recent Supreme 
Court rulings for support. In the first, Riley v. 
California in 2014, the justices held that 
authorities couldn’t search a smartphone’s 
data without a warrant. In the second, U.S. v. 
Jones in 2012, they ruled that attaching a GPS 
tracker to a car without seeking a warrant first 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The Sixth Circuit rejected the ACLU’s 
reasoning. Riley covered the wealth of 
internal data that a phone can store, including 
emails, notes, photos, and text  messages; and 
not the limited kind of location data logged 
on corporate servers, wrote Judge Raymond 
Kethledge in the majority opinion. And the 
precise GPS tracking at issue in Jones, he 
said, doesn’t approach the general locational 
awareness permitted by CSLI. 
Historical CSLI is “as much as 12,500 times 
less accurate than the GPS data in Jones,” 
wrote Kethledge. “And cellphone locational 
data are even less precise in suburban and 
rural settings [than urban ones]. Areas of this 
scale might encompass bridal stores and Bass 
Pro Shops, gay bars and straight ones, a 
Methodist church and the local mosque.” 
Instead, Kethledge vindicates the federal 
privacy test that has been in effect since the 
late 1970s: the third-party doctrine, which 
holds Americans do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to data created and 
logged by an outside corporation. This law 
differentiates between the private content of 
a communication and the information needed 
to convey it, and it’s why police need a 
warrant to wiretap a phone call but not to 
request call records. 
But the Sixth Circuit’s ruling was not 
unanimous. While Judge Jane Stranch 
concurred with Kethledge’s decision, she 
disagreed that long-term historical CSLI was 
straightforwardly Constitutional. Fourth 
Amendment protection isn’t just a matter of 
precision, she said, approvingly citing a line 
from the Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma: 
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There may be situations where police, 
using otherwise legal methods, so 
comprehensively track a person’s 
activities that the very 
comprehensiveness of the tracking is 
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. 
Stranch writes that CSLI sits uncomfortably 
between the law governing location 
information and the law governing business 
records. “I do not think that treating the CSLI 
obtained as a ‘business record’ and applying 
that test addresses our circuit’s stated concern 
regarding long-term, comprehensive tracking 
of an individual’s location without a 
warrant,” she writes. Ultimately, she writes, 
the Sixth Circuit or a higher court may need 
to develop a new legal test to determine 
exactly what kinds of search require a 
warrant. 
The day when the Supreme Court formulates 
that test, however, may now not come for 
years. In upholding the constitutionality of 
warrantless CSLI requests, the Sixth Circuit 
joins two other federal appeals courts, the 
Fifth and the Eleventh Circuit. All three 
courts have now ruled that seeking months of 
historical cell-site data without a warrant is 
perfectly legal. 
As recently as last year, that looked like it 
might change. Last summer, the Fourth 
Circuit ruled that this kind of warrantless 
CSLI request was illegal. The ACLU also 
asked the Supreme Court to take up a case on 
the same question. But the high court 
declined the petition, and, in October, the 
Fourth Circuit decided to rehear the CSLI 
case again as a full court. This vacates its 
earlier ruling and removes the brief circuit 
split. 
So the legal status of warrantless cellphone 
tracking remains messy: a drive up Interstate 
95 would take you through states where a 
warrant is required for all CSLI, for just 
historical CSLI, for some historical CSLI—
and where no warrant is required at all. The 
ACLU has created a map of what protections 
exist in each state. I’ve embedded it below. 
There’s a good chance that it will get even 
more complicated before it starts to improve: 
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Class v. United States 
16-424 
Ruling Below: United States v. Class, No. 13-253 -RWR- 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2014).  
 
Class sought a reversal of the judgement of the District Court where he had plead guilty, 
seemingly knowingly waiving his right to appeal.  
 
The Court states that unconditional guilty pleas traditionally waive the defendant’s right to 
appeal, even on constitutional grounds.  
Class appealed, claiming three counts of constitutional error and one count of statutory error. The 
Court stated that none of the four counts were proper exceptions to the waiver.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed.   
 
Question Presented: Whether a guilty plea inherently waives a defendant's right to challenge 
the constitutionality of his statute of conviction. 
Rodney Class, 
v. 
United States. 
 
D.C. Circuit Court 
Decided on July 5, 2016 
 [Excerpt some citations and footnotes removed].
This appeal was considered on the record 
from the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia and on the briefs of the 
parties and oral arguments of counsel. The 
Court has accorded the issues full 
consideration and has determined that they 
do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. 
CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, 
it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the 
judgment of the district court be affirmed.   
 
Appellant Rodney Class pleaded guilty in the 
district court to possession of a firearm on 
Capitol grounds in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 
5104(e). Although the defendant appeared 
pro se at the time of the plea, he had 
previously been represented by appointed 
counsel and counsel had been discharged at 
his request, although the Federal Public 
Defender served as stand-by or 
advisory counsel. Despite his sometime lack 
of counsel, the plea followed extended 
motions practice and was memorialized in a 
plea agreement.   
 
The district court conducted a full inquiry 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11. That inquiry included the 
following exchange:   
 
THE COURT: If you went to trial and 
you were convicted, you would have 
a right to appeal your conviction to 
the Court of Appeals and to have a 
lawyer help you prepare your appeal. 
Do you understand that?   
 
[APPELLANT]: Yes.   
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THE COURT: Do you know what I 
mean by your right to appeal?   
 
[APPELLANT]: Yeah. Take it to the 
next court up.   
 
THE COURT: All right. Now, by 
pleading guilty, you would be 
generally giving up your rights to 
appeal. Do you understand that?   
 
[APPELLANT]: Yes.   
 
THE COURT: Now, there are 
exceptions to that. You can appeal a 
conviction after a guilty plea if you 
believe that your guilty plea was 
somehow unlawful or involuntary or 
if there is some other fundamental 
defect in these guilty-plea 
proceedings. You may also have a 
right to appeal your sentence if you 
think the sentence is illegal. Do you 
understand those things?   
 
[APPELLANT]: Yeah. Pretty much.   
 
THE COURT: Now, if you plead 
guilty in this case and I accept your 
guilty plea, you’ll give up all of the 
rights I just explained to you, aside 
from the exceptions that I mentioned, 
because there will not be any trial, 
and there will probably be no appeal. 
Do you understand that?   
 
[APPELLANT]: Yes.   
 
Tr. of Plea Hearing at 16:2—17:4, United 
States v. Class, No. 13-253 -RWR- 1 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 21, 2014).   
 
On appeal, Class attempts to assert three 
grounds of constitutional error and a further 
claim of statutory error. None of them are 
properly before us.   
 
It is well-established law that 
“[u]nconditional guilty pleas that are 
knowing and intelligent. . . waive the 
pleading defendant{’sJ claims of error on 
appeal, even constitutional 
claims.” United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 
374 F.3d 1337, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). Although the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provide for conditional 
pleas wherein a pleading defendant may 
“reserv[e] in writing the right to have an 
appellate court review an adverse 
determination of a specified pretrial motion,” 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 1 1(a)(2), the defendant’s 
plea in the present case contains no such 
reservation.   
 
The plea agreement included an explicit 
waiver of appeal rights as to sentencing errors 
and collateral attacks on the conviction, but 
not as to alleged errors in the indictment or in 
proceedings before the sentencing. Appellant 
apparently believes that the lack of an explicit 
waiver permits him to proceed in the present 
appeal. He is in error. The holding from 
Delgado Garcia quoted above reflects the 
universally-recognized law of the United 
States. See, e.g., Tollettv. Henderson, 411 
U.S. 258, 266-68 (1973).   
 
There are two recognized exceptions to this 
rule: “the defendant’s claimed right not to 
be hauled into court at all,” and a claim “that 
the court below lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the case. . . .“ Delgado-
Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1341 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Neither 
claimed exception applies here. We therefore 
affirm the judgment of the district court.   
 
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this 
disposition will not be published. The Clerk 
is directed to withhold issuance of the 
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mandate herein until seven days after 
resolution of any timely petition for rehearing 
or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4 1(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(l). 
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“Justices To Decide If Guilty Plea Ends Constitutional Claims” 
 
Law360 
Jody Godoy 
February 21, 2017 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday 
to decide whether a defendant who pled 
guilty to violating federal law still has the 
right to challenge the law's constitutionality 
on appeal, an issue the petitioner claims 
could affect the majority of criminal cases. 
Rodney Class pled guilty to unlawfully 
bringing a gun into a parking lot near the U.S. 
Capitol but argued in both D.C. federal court 
and appeals court that the law was 
unconstitutional. The D.C. Circuit denied the 
appeal, pointing to an earlier holding that 
defendants give up the right a constitutional 
challenge when they plead guilty. 
The vast majority of criminal cases end in 
guilty pleas, making it important for the 
Supreme Court to get the appeals courts on 
the same page, Class argued in his September 
petition. 
“The criminal justice system is essentially a 
series of plea negotiations — and yet the 
parties to those negotiations are operating 
without a clear understanding of the 
necessary consequences of the plea itself,” 
Class said. 
The D.C. Circuit is on one side of a split over 
how to apply two Supreme Court decisions 
from the mid-1970s, Blackledge v. Perry and 
Menna v. New York. In those cases, the high 
court found that guilty pleas do not preclude 
appeals claiming vindictive prosecution or 
double jeopardy, respectively. 
Five appeals courts have applied those 
holdings to find a guilty plea is not an 
automatic waiver of a constitutional 
challenge, a position Class has urged the 
Supreme Court to adopt. 
On the other side, the government contends 
that Blackledge and Menna actually carve out 
a narrow exception for constitutional claims 
involving the “power of the state to bring the 
defendant into court,” not the laws 
themselves. 
The government argued in a brief replying to 
Class' petition that his guilty plea only 
preserved his right to appeal legal problems 
with the plea itself. Aside from challenges to 
the court's jurisdiction, the government 
claims Class implicitly waived the right to 
bring other appeals. 
According to Class, a third group of appeals 
courts have allowed challenges to a law's 
constitutionality, like Class' claim that the 
law itself is unconstitutionally vague about 
where the Capitol grounds end, but blocked 
claims relating to the law's application, like 
Class' complaint that there was no sign telling 
him he was on the Capitol grounds. The 
Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits are in 
this camp. 
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Stephanos Bibas, director of the Supreme 
Court Clinic at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, says the justices 
could issue a finding that gives white collar 
defendants more leeway to challenge 
criminal statutes and how they are applied. 
“The leverage to get white collar defendants 
to plead is enormous, so the government can 
kind of insulate some of these issues from 
judicial review,” Bibas said. 
If the court finds that an otherwise 
unconditional guilty plea does not preempt 
constitutional challenges, more defendants 
will likely raise those issues in white collar 
cases, Bibas said. 
Counsel for Class did not immediately reply 
to a request for comment. The government 
does not comment on pending litigation. 
Class is represented by Jessica Ring 
Amunson of Jenner & Block LLP. 
The government is represented by Finnuala 
K. Tessier. 
The case is Rodney Class v. U.S., case 
number 15-3015, in the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
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“Guilty Plea's Constitutional Consequence Heads To High Court” 
 
Law360 
Daniel Wenner and Danielle Corcione 
May 12, 2017 
 
Federal criminal prosecutions almost always 
result in guilty pleas.[1] When faced with the 
likelihood of an expensive and lengthy trial 
and, perhaps, a longer sentence for exercising 
the trial right, see Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 
133, 144 (2012), defendants often make what 
is the sensible choice: they plead guilty. The 
U.S. Supreme Court recognizes this reality 
and has emphasized the importance of 
prudent and sage counsel in the plea-
bargaining process. Id. at 143. 
In contemplating whether to plead guilty, a 
defendant must be cognizant of Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11’s requirement that 
“[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, 
the court must determine that there is a 
factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(b)(3). In layman’s terms, that means that 
one can’t plead guilty unless he or she is, in 
fact, guilty. And what determines guilt? 
Whether the person did the things that violate 
the elements of the statute the defendant is 
charged with having violated. 
But what happens when the person did the 
things proscribed, but doesn’t think the 
proscription is proper? What if he thinks the 
statute is unconstitutional? Must he go to 
trial? May he raise that issue in the district 
court, plead guilty if he loses his motion, and 
appeal? Well, as of now, that depends where 
he lives. Whether a constitutional challenge 
survives after a client pleads guilty varies by 
circuit. But, the Supreme Court will consider 
in Class v. United States “[w]hether a guilty 
plea inherently waives a defendant’s right to 
challenge the constitutionality of his statute 
of conviction.” And hopefully, it will settle 
the matter. 
What Is the Legal Background? 
In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), 
the Supreme Court allowed a defendant who 
had pleaded guilty to raise a double jeopardy 
claim on appeal, even though he had not 
explicitly preserved that claim. In Menna v. 
New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), the Supreme 
Court endorsed that view regarding a claim 
of vindictive prosecution. In each of those 
cases, the court reasoned that those types of 
claims are not necessarily resolved by the 
guilty plea because such a plea determines 
only whether the government could prove the 
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt as 
to the facts. But it does not inform whether 
the prosecution was properly brought. Are 
these the only situations in which an 
unpreserved claim might be pressed on 
appeal from a guilty plea? That question lays 
at the heart of the dispute in Class. 
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What Are the Facts? 
Rodney Class is a retired veteran who lived 
in North Carolina. Class traveled to 
Washington, D.C., in May 2013 and brought 
his lawfully owned firearms, which he left in 
closed bags in his locked vehicle. He parked 
in a public lot about 1,000 feet from the U.S. 
Capitol building. Class didn’t know the 
public lot was part of the “Capitol grounds,” 
which is defined by statute and is an area 
where all weapons are prohibited. See 40 
U.S.C. §5104(e). When Class was away from 
his vehicle, a police officer saw in the cab of 
the vehicle what she mistakenly believed to 
be a gun holster. 
When Class returned, he spoke with the 
officer and admitted that he had weapons in 
the car. Law enforcement obtained a search 
warrant to search the vehicle. That search 
resulted in the recovery of a number of 
firearms and ammunition. Class was arrested, 
and the grand jury indicted him in a two-
count indictment. Class was charged with one 
count of unlawfully carrying or having 
readily accessible a firearm on Capital 
grounds, in violation of 40 U.S.C. 
§5104(e)(1), and one count of carrying a 
pistol in public, in violation of D.C. Code 
§22-4504(a) (2012). (Ironically, the second 
count was dismissed because the statute was 
ultimately deemed to be unconstitutional. See 
Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 
3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014).) 
Class waived his right to counsel. Acting pro 
se, Class raised several challenges to 
§5104(e)(1), including that it 
unconstitutionally infringed on his rights 
under the Second Amendment and violated 
the Due Process Clause. The district court 
asked the parties to brief these arguments, 
held a hearing, and ultimately denied Class’ 
claims. 
The district court set the case down for trial, 
but Class ultimately agreed to plead guilty 
pursuant to a written plea agreement. The 
plea agreement did not contain a waiver of his 
right to appeal his conviction. It also did not 
concede that §5104 was constitutional. 
During the guilty plea colloquy, the district 
judge advised Class that he could “‘appeal a 
conviction after a guilty plea if [he] 
believe[d] that [his] guilty plea was somehow 
unlawful.’” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
8, Class v. United States, No. 16-424 (Sept. 
30, 2016). He received a sentence of 24 days 
of imprisonment to be followed by a 12-
month term of supervised release. Brief for 
the United States in Opposition at 4–5, Class 
v. United States, No. 16-424 (Dec. 2016). 
After his conviction was final, Class appealed 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. He argued, in a pro se 
merits brief, that §5104(e) was 
unconstitutional because it unlawfully 
infringed on his right to “keep and bear arms” 
under the Second Amendment. The 
government did not move to dismiss the 
appeal. Instead, it argued in its merits brief 
“that even though [Class’] plea did not 
contain any express waiver of the right to 
appeal his conviction, the plea inherently 
waived his right to raise any constitutional 
claims that accrued before he pleaded guilty, 
including his constitutional challenges to the 
statute.” Petition at 10. In his reply brief, 
Class disputed this contention, arguing that 
his constitutional challenges survived his 
plea because he was not challenging his 
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“factual guilt” on appeal; rather, he was 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute 
to which he pleaded guilty. 
The D.C. Circuit affirmed his conviction. It 
reasoned that by pleading guilty, he 
inherently waived his claims of error on 
appeal, including his constitutional claims. It 
also cited circuit precedent holding that by 
pleading guilty, Class’s constitutional claims 
could only survive if they were so flagrant 
that he could not be haled into court to defend 
himself. 
What Were the Arguments Regarding a Writ 
of Certiorari? 
Class petitioned for a writ of certiorari, 
arguing that there is a circuit split on this 
issue. He noted that some circuits, including 
the D.C. Circuit have “held that a plea 
inherently waives every underlying 
constitutional claim except the double 
jeopardy and vindictive prosecution claims.” 
Petition at 12. Other circuits — the Third, 
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits — 
have held “that a guilty plea concedes factual 
guilt—but does not necessarily concede or 
waive the constitutionality of the statute of 
conviction itself.” Id. Finally, the Fourth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits strike “a middle 
ground, allowing facial—but not as-
applied—challenges to survive a guilty plea.” 
Id. 
The government opposed Class’ petition. It 
argued that the Supreme Court should deny 
the petition for three reasons: “The court of 
appeals’ unpublished disposition is correct; 
this case would be a poor vehicle for 
reviewing the question presented; and no 
further review is warranted.” Opposition at 6. 
The government endorsed the view of the 
court of appeals that by pleading guilty 
without explicitly preserving his right to 
appeal the constitutionality of the statute, 
Class forfeited that argument. Id. at 6–7. It 
distinguished Blackledge and Menna by 
arguing that in those cases, “‘the very act of 
haling the defendants into court completed 
the constitutional violation.’” Id. at 8 
(quoting United States v. Miranda, 780 F.3d 
1185, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). It contended 
the case was a poor vehicle for this issue 
because of certain factual stumbling blocks 
as well as because there is no merit to Class’ 
Second Amendment argument. Id. at 7, 15. It 
also argued that the proper place to raise a 
constitutional challenge after a guilty plea is 
on collateral review in a habeas corpus 
petition. Id. at 18. 
Notwithstanding the government’s 
opposition to Class’ petition, the Supreme 
Court granted the writ. Complete briefing is 
due in July 2017. 
What’s at Stake? 
The Supreme Court will decide if a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional challenge to the 
statute of conviction survives after a guilty 
plea is entered. On balance, voluntary 
agreements memorialized in a plea 
agreement and accepted by the district court 
are binding. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2) 
(laying out the narrow grounds upon which a 
defendant may withdraw a guilty plea). At 
the plea hearing, the court engages in a 
colloquy to determine if a defendant is 
competent, understands the gravity of 
pleading guilty, is doing so willingly, and that 
there is a factual basis to accept the guilty 
plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). Further, 
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a guilty “plea may be set aside only on direct 
appeal or collateral attack.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(f). 
Seemingly following the proper procedures, 
Class raised the constitutional issues in the 
district court and lost. He then pleaded guilty 
and appealed, not claiming he didn’t commit 
the crime, but contending that the crime was 
unconstitutional. He pleaded guilty, without 
explicitly waving his right to appeal his 
conviction, and then contested the 
constitutionality of the statute on appeal. 
Whether the Supreme Court endorses that 
approach is anyone’s guess, but regardless of 
the result in this case, the impact for 
defendants general might be minor because 
of conditional guilty pleas. 
Certainly, Class would be in a different 
position had he bargained in his plea 
agreement for the right to appeal the specific 
constitutional question. This happens all the 
time when defendants move to suppress 
evidence, such as the drugs seized in a drug-
possession case. And it is explicitly 
authorized by Rule 11, which allows a 
defendant with the government’s consent to 
“enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, reserving in writing the right to 
have an appellate court review an adverse 
determination of a specified pretrial motion.” 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). And it is the better 
course to ensure that any pretrial issues that a 
defendant wants to preserve should be 
spelled out and explicitly carved from the 
plea agreement. 
Where Does That Leave Us? 
Counsel should recognize the importance of 
negotiating a plea agreement that 
incorporates the conditional language of Rule 
11(a)(2). While it might end up that such 
conditional language is unnecessary should 
Class prevail, it would remain an important 
belt-and-suspenders approach to ensure that 
any defendant is not caught in Class’ 
position: thinking he could appeal something 
raised below, even when the something is as 
fundamental as the constitutionality of the 
statute. After all, the government already 
considered Blackledge and Menna to be 
properly limited to their particular facts, and 
might do the same even if Class prevails. 
Foreclosing all doubt in what may and may 
not be appealed might just be the preferred 
tack when it comes to guilty pleas. 
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District of Columbia v. Wesby 
15-1485 
Ruling Below: Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F. 3d (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
Wesby and his co-plaintiffs sought relief for false arrests and violations of their Fourth 
Amendment rights. They claimed that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest 
them for unlawful entry because there was uncontroverted evidence that they were invited to the 
property in question. The District Court granted summary judgement for the Plaintiffs and held 
the District liable. The District appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the summary 
judgement and upheld the District’s liability.  
Question Presented: Whether police officers who found late-night partiers inside a vacant home 
belonging to someone else had probable cause to arrest the partiers for trespassing under the Fourth 
Amendment, and in particular whether, when the owner of a vacant home informs police that he 
has not authorized entry, an officer assessing probable cause to arrest those inside for trespassing 
may discredit the suspects' questionable claims of an innocent mental state? 
Whether, even if there was no probable cause to arrest the apparent trespassers, the officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established in this regard? 
Theodore Wesby, 
v. 
District of Columbia. 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on September 2, 2014 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
PILLARD, Circuit Judge: A group of late-
night partygoers responded to a friend’s 
invitation to gather at a home in the District 
of Columbia. The host had told some friends 
she was moving into a new place and they 
should come by for a party. Some of them 
informally extended the invitation to their 
own friends, resulting in a group of twenty-
one people convening at the house. With the 
festivities well underway, Metropolitan 
Police Department (“MPD”) officers 
responded to a neighbor’s complaint of 
illegal activity. When the police arrived, the 
host was not there. The officers reached her 
by phone, and then called the person she 
identified as the property owner, only to 
discover that the putative host had not 
finalized any rental agreement and so lacked 
the right to authorize the soiree. The officers 
arrested everyone present for unlawful entry. 
But because it was undisputed that the 
arresting officers knew the Plaintiffs had 
been invited to the house by a woman that 
they reasonably believed to be its lawful 
occupant, the officers lacked probable cause 
for the arrest. Nor was there probable cause 
to arrest for disorderly conduct because the 
evidence failed to show any disturbance of 
sufficient magnitude to violate local law. We 
accordingly affirm the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the 
ground that the arrests violated their clearly 
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established Fourth Amendment rights and 
District of Columbia law against false arrest. 
Because the supervising police sergeant at 
the scene also overstepped clear law in 
directing the arrests, the district court also 
correctly held the District of Columbia liable 
for negligent supervision.  
 
I.  
 
The District of Columbia and two police 
officers in their individual capacities appeal 
the district court’s liability determinations 
resulting from the grant of partial summary 
judgment against them. The court granted 
partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor 
because, given the uncontroverted evidence 
of record regarding the information known to 
the sergeant and two of the officers at the 
time of the arrests, no reasonable officer in 
their shoes could have found probable cause 
to arrest any of the Plaintiffs. The court’s 
grant of summary judgment was only partial, 
however, in several ways: First, the court 
denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment against several other officers in the 
face of factual disputes about what they knew 
at the scene; the Plaintiffs then abandoned 
those claims and the court dismissed them 
with prejudice. Second, the court granted the 
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary 
judgment on claims against all of the officers 
in their official capacities, dismissing those 
claims, too, with prejudice. Finally, the 
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was 
limited to liability, leaving remedial 
determinations to the jury. At a trial on 
damages, the jury awarded each Plaintiff 
between $35,000 and $50,000 in 
compensatory damages. The only questions 
on this appeal address the validity of the 
partial summary judgment liability holding.   
For purposes of appeal of a grant of a 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to 
defendants. In the early morning hours of 
March 16, 2008, the MPD dispatched officers 
to investigate a complaint of illegal activities 
taking place at a house in Washington, D.C. 
The officers heard loud music as they 
approached the house and, upon entering, 
saw people acting in a way they viewed as 
consistent “with activity being conducted in 
strip clubs for profit”—several scantily clad 
women with money tucked into garter belts, 
in addition to “spectators . . . drinking 
alcoholic beverages and holding [U.S.] 
currency in their hands.” Some of the guests 
scattered into other rooms when the police 
arrived. The parties dispute how fully the 
house was “furnished,” but the police 
observed at least some folding chairs, a 
mattress, and working electricity and 
plumbing. 
 
One of the Defendants-Appellants, Officer 
Anthony Campanale, took photographs of 
the scene and, along with other officers, 
interviewed everyone present to find out 
what they were doing at the house. The 
partygoers gave conflicting responses, with 
some saying they were there for a birthday 
party and others that the occasion was a 
bachelor party. Someone told 
Officer Campanale that a woman referred to 
as “Peaches” had given them permission to 
be in the house; others said that they had been 
invited to the party by another guest. Peaches 
was not at the house. Nobody who was 
present claimed to live there or could identify 
who owned the house.   
 
Another Defendant-Appellant, Officer Andre 
Parker, spoke to a woman who told him that 
Peaches “was renting the house from the 
grandson of the owner who had 
recently passed away and that [the grandson] 
had given permission for all individuals to be 
in the house.” The woman then used her cell 
phone to call Peaches. Officer Parker spoke 
to Peaches, who refused to return to the house 
because she said she would be arrested if she 
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did. When Officer Parker asked who gave her 
permission to be at the house, Peaches told 
Officer Parker that he could “confirm it with 
the grandson.” Officer Parker then used the 
same phone to call the apparent owner, 
identified in the record only as Mr. Hughes, 
who told Officer Parker that he was trying to 
work out a lease arrangement with Peaches 
but had yet to do so. Hughes also told Officer 
Parker that the people in the house did not 
have his permission to be there that evening.   
 
Sergeant Andre Suber, an MPD supervisor 
who was acting as the watch commander that 
night, arrived on the scene after the officers 
had begun their investigation. The officers 
briefed Sergeant Suber, including telling him 
about Parker’s conversations with Peaches 
and Hughes. Sergeant Suber also spoke to 
Peaches directly by phone. According to 
Sergeant Suber, Peaches told him that “she 
was possibly renting the house from the 
owner who was fixing the house up for her” 
and that she “gave the people who were 
inside the place, told them they could have 
the bachelor party.” As the police continued 
to talk to Peaches, she acknowledged that she 
did not have permission to use the house. On 
that basis— and notwithstanding the 
undisputed statements of both the guests and 
Peaches that she had given them permission 
to be at the house—Sergeant Suber ordered 
the officers to arrest everyone for unlawful 
entry.  
 
After the police arrested and transported the 
partygoers to the police station, 
Sergeant Suber and the lieutenant taking over 
as watch commander discussed the 
appropriate charges for the Plaintiffs. 
According to Sergeant Suber, the lieutenant 
decided to change the charge to disorderly 
conduct after speaking with a representative 
from the District of Columbia Attorney 
General’s office. Sergeant Suber disagreed, 
but the lieutenant overruled him. The officers 
who had been at the house, including 
Sergeant Suber, each testified that they had 
neither seen nor heard anything to justify a 
disorderly conduct charge.   
 
Sixteen of the arrestees sued five officers for 
false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
officers and the District for false arrest under 
common law, and the District for negligent 
supervision. On cross-motions for partial 
summary judgment as to liability, the district 
court granted the parties’ motions in part and 
denied both motions on some issues. The 
court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on their 
claims of false arrest against Officers Parker 
and Campanale in their individual capacities, 
and on the common law false arrest and 
negligent supervision claims against the 
District. Defendants appeal these liability 
determinations.   
 
II.  
 
We review de novo a district court’s 
summary judgment ruling, “apply[ing] the 
same standard of review applicable to the 
underlying claims in the district court.” 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 
913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A party is entitled 
to summary judgment where, “viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the nonmoving party’s 
favor,” Ne. Hosp. Corp. v. Sebelius, 657 F.3d 
1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011), this Court determines 
that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).   
 
We begin with Plaintiffs’ entitlement to 
summary judgment on their Section 1983 and 
common-law false arrest claims. Because 
“[t]he elements of a constitutional claim for 
false arrest are substantially identical to the 
elements of a common-law false arrest 
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claim,” we address the merits of those claims 
together. See Scott v. District of Columbia, 
101 F.3d 748, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(citing Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 175 
(D.C. Cir. 1977)). As with most false arrest 
claims, Plaintiffs’ claims “turn on the issue of 
whether the arresting officer[s] had probable 
cause to believe that [Plaintiffs] committed a 
crime.” Id. at 754. Defendants argue that the 
district court erred in finding the arrests 
unsupported by probable cause because, in 
their view, the officers had objectively valid 
bases to arrest the Plaintiffs both for unlawful 
entry and disorderly conduct. In the 
alternative, Defendants contend that, even if 
probable cause were lacking, the officers are 
shielded from liability by qualified immunity 
and a common-law privilege. We address 
these contentions in turn.   
 
A.  
 
The assessment of probable cause is an 
objective one. An arrest is supported by 
probable cause if, “at the moment the arrest 
was made, . . . the facts and circumstances 
within [the arresting officers’] knowledge 
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information were sufficient to warrant a 
prudent man in believing” that the suspect 
has committed or is committing a 
crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).   
 
Based on the undisputed facts relevant to the 
knowledge the police had at the time of the 
arrests, and “giv[ing] due weight to 
inferences drawn” by the officers, we 
consider de novo whether those facts support 
a determination of probable cause to 
arrest. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 
690, 697, 699 (1996). Defendants contend 
that they were justified in arresting 
Plaintiffs for unlawful entry and disorderly 
conduct. To determine whether they had 
probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs were 
violating District of Columbia law, we look 
to District law to identify the elements of 
each of those offenses. See Michigan 
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979). Upon 
examination of the relevant statutes and case 
law, we conclude that no reasonable officer 
could have concluded that there was probable 
cause to arrest Plaintiffs for either crime.   
 
Unlawful Entry. At the time of Plaintiffs’ 
arrests, District of Columbia law made it a 
misdemeanor for a person to, “without lawful 
authority, . . . enter, or attempt to enter, any 
public or private dwelling, building, or other 
property, or part of such dwelling, building, 
or other property, against the will of the 
lawful occupant or of the person lawfully in 
charge thereof.” D.C. Code § 22-3302 
(2008). To sustain a conviction for unlawful 
entry, the government must prove that “(1) 
the accused entered or attempted to enter 
public or private premises or property; (2) he 
did so without lawful authority; (3) he did so 
against the express will of the lawful 
occupant or owner; and (4) general intent to 
enter.” Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174, 
1176 (D.C. 1985).   
 
The probable-cause inquiry in this case 
centers on the third and fourth elements, 
which together identify the culpable mental 
state for unlawful entry. See Ortberg v. 
United States, 81 A.3d 303, 305 (D.C. 2013). 
Specifically, the question is whether a 
reasonable officer with the information that 
the officers had at the time of the arrests 
could have concluded that Plaintiffs knew or 
should have known they had entered the 
house “against the will of the lawful occupant 
or of the person lawfully in charge thereof,” 
and intended to act in the face of that 
knowledge. D.C. Code § 22-3302; 
see Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 305; Artisst v. United 
States, 554 A.2d 327, 330 (D.C. 1989).   
 
Probable cause “does not require the same 
type of specific evidence of each element of 
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the offense as would be needed to support a 
conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143, 149 (1972). But the police cannot 
establish probable cause without at least 
some evidence supporting the elements of a 
particular offense, including the requisite 
mental state. United States v. Christian, 187 
F.3d 663, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Because the 
offense of parading without a permit, for 
example, requires knowledge that no permit 
issued, “officers who make such an arrest 
must have reasonable grounds to believe” 
that the suspects knew no permit had been 
granted. Carr v. District of Columbia, 587 
F.3d 401, 410-11 (D.C. Cir. 2009).   
 
In this case, the officers on the scene had 
three pieces of information that could bear on 
whether the Plaintiffs knew or should have 
known that they had entered a house against 
the owner’s express will. First, the officers 
had Plaintiffs’ statements that they had been 
invited to some kind of party at the house, 
with inconsistent and conflicting statements 
about the type of party. Second, the officers 
had explicit, uncontroverted statements from 
Peaches and a guest at the scene that Peaches 
had told the people inside the house that they 
could be there. Finally, the officers had a 
statement by the claimed owner of the house 
that he had been trying unsuccessfully to 
arrange a lease with Peaches and that he had 
not given the people in the house permission 
to be there.   
 
As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue 
that Peaches’ invitation is irrelevant to the 
determination of probable cause, because 
whether the Plaintiffs had a bona fide belief 
in their right to enter the house “simply raises 
a defense for the criminal trial.” That 
argument misses the mark. The District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals recently 
reiterated that “the existence of a reasonable, 
good faith belief [in permission to enter] is a 
valid defense precisely because it precludes 
the government from proving what it must—
that a defendant knew or should have known 
that his entry was against the will of the 
lawful occupant.” Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 309 
(emphasis added).   
 
It is true that, if prosecuted for unlawful 
entry, a defendant may raise as a defense that 
he entered the building “with a good purpose 
and with a bona fide belief of his right to 
enter.” Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438, 
439 (D.C. 1971); see United States v. 
Thomas, 444 F.2d 919, 926 (D.C. Cir. 
1971); Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 308-09. But the 
cases interpreting the unlawful-entry statute 
are clear and consistent that such a defense is 
available precisely because a person with a 
good purpose and bona fide belief of her right 
to enter “lacks the element of criminal intent 
required” by the statute. Smith, 281 A.2d at 
439; see also McGloin v. United States, 232 
A.2d 90, 91 (D.C. 1967) (dismissing concern 
about unintentional violations of the statute, 
because “one who enters for a good purpose 
and with a bona fide belief of his right to enter 
is not guilty of unlawful entry”); Bowman, 
212 A.2d 610, 611-12 (D.C. 1965) (“[O]ne 
who enters . . . for a good purpose and with 
bona fide belief of his right to enter . . . would 
not be guilty of an unlawful entry . . . .”).  
 
Thus, contrary to Defendants’ argument, 
Peaches’ invitation is central to our 
consideration of whether a reasonable officer 
could have believed that the Plaintiffs had 
entered the house unlawfully. That is 
because, in the absence of any conflicting 
information, Peaches’ invitation vitiates the 
necessary element of Plaintiffs’ intent to 
enter against the will of the lawful owner. A 
reasonably prudent officer aware that the 
Plaintiffs gathered pursuant to an invitation 
from someone with apparent (if illusory) 
authority could not conclude that they had 
entered unlawfully.   
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Ignoring the significance of Peaches’ 
invitation, Defendants argue that Hughes’s 
statement that he had not given the Plaintiffs 
permission to be in the house is dispositive 
because a homeowner’s denial that he has 
given permission to enter his property is 
sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest 
for unlawful entry. We disagree. Importantly, 
Hughes never said that he or anyone else had 
told the Plaintiffs that they were not welcome 
in the house. Peaches eventually admitted 
that she did not have permission to be in the 
house or to invite others, but there is no 
evidence that she had told the Plaintiffs as 
much. Indeed, the evidence is uniform that 
the arrestees all were invited, and there is 
simply no evidence in the record that they had 
any reason to think the invitation was invalid. 
All of the information that the police had 
gathered by the time of the arrest made clear 
that Plaintiffs had every reason to think that 
they had entered the house with the express 
consent of someone they believed to be the 
lawful occupant. Accordingly, there was 
no probable cause for the officers to believe 
that the Plaintiffs entered the house knowing 
that they did so against the will of the owner 
or occupant.   
 
The cases on which Defendants rely do not 
compel a different conclusion. Citing 
to McGloin, 232 A.2d 90, and Culp, 486 A.2d 
1174, Defendants argue that Hughes’s 
statement was sufficient because “[t]he 
offense of unlawful entry does not require 
any kind of prior warning in the case of a 
private dwelling.” Br. for Appellants 
22. Culp and McGloin establish that an 
owner of a private dwelling need not post any 
sign or warning in order to express an intent 
to exclude the general public. See Culp, 486 
A.2d at 1177 (probable cause for unlawful 
entry where the building is vacant and “the 
property itself reveals indications of a 
continued claim of possession by the owner 
or manager”); McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91 
(“[S]urely no one would contend that one 
may lawfully enter a private dwelling house 
simply because there is no sign or warning 
forbidding entry.”). But those cases do not 
apply here, because the Plaintiffs did not 
simply find a house that appealed to them and 
walk in off the street; they entered the 
specified home at the invitation of someone 
they reasonably believed was an authorized 
inhabitant.   
 
Defendants’ reading 
of Culp and McGloin would provide 
probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry 
any individual in a private dwelling without 
the express permission of the owner. Such a 
rule would transform the unlawful-entry 
statute from one barring entry “against the 
will of the owner” into one criminalizing 
entry “without the express invitation of the 
owner.” A brunch host who overstays her 
lease does not thereby expose her invited 
guests to arrest for unlawful entry, nor does a 
person summoned onto property by a 
stranger who appears to be the lawful 
inhabitant commit the crime of unlawful 
entry if she reasonably fails to recognize that 
the stranger is not the owner at all, but a 
traveling salesman. What the unlawful-entry 
law requires is some showing that the 
individual entered a place that she knew or 
should have known she was not entitled to 
be.   
 
The cases Defendants cite merely recognize 
that certain factual circumstances not present 
here make it reasonable to infer an 
interloper’s intent to enter against the will of 
the owner. McGloin, for example, upheld an 
unlawful-entry conviction where the 
defendant entered an apartment building, ran 
up the fire escape and then onto the roof, and 
said first that he was looking for his cat and 
then “for a friend named DeWitt who lived in 
the building,” when no one by that name 
lived there. 232 A.2d at 90. In his 
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defense, McGloin relied on Bowman, where 
the court held that an entry into a semi-public 
space was not unlawful unless the owner had 
given an express “warning to keep off,” 
which could be expressed verbally or “by 
sign.” See McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91 
(quoting Bowman, 212 A.2d at 611). 
Distinguishing Bowman, the court 
emphasized that McGloin entered “not a 
public or semi-public building,” but an 
apartment building containing four private 
family dwellings. Id. Under such 
circumstances, it was “more than plain that 
wandering through the building, climbing on 
the roof or perching on the fire escape would 
be against the will of the owner.” Id.   
 
Culp addressed what inferences the police 
may reasonably draw when a person enters a 
property that appears to be vacant. In that 
case, the police saw three men, including the 
defendant, inside a “dilapidated” public 
housing property. See Culp, 486 A.2d at 
1175. The men tried to leave through the back 
door when they saw the police approaching, 
and the defendant “could not explain his 
presence” when the officers asked what he 
was doing there. Id. Culp challenged his 
arrest for unlawful entry on the basis that the 
police lacked probable cause to believe that 
he knew he was entering the house against the 
will of the occupant. See id. The court found 
that the officers had probable cause to arrest 
Culp because “there were sufficient 
indications of efforts by [the housing 
authority] to protect the property against 
intruders that the officers could reasonably 
conclude that [Culp] knowingly entered 
against the will of the person lawfully in 
charge.” Id. at 1177 (quotation marks and 
ellipsis omitted). The housing authority had 
made “continuous and diligent efforts to 
board up the house” and at least some of the 
windows remained boarded up when Culp 
entered. Id.   
 
The arresting officers in this case, unlike 
those in McGloin and Culp, observed 
nothing inconsistent with the reason the 
Plaintiffs gave for being there—a reason that 
was corroborated, rather than undermined, by 
the information that Peaches gave to the 
officers: Peaches had invited them to her new 
apartment. Defendants point to the “highly 
suspicious and incriminating” activities the 
officers observed in the house to bolster the 
argument that the officers had no reason to 
credit the Plaintiffs’ explanation for their 
presence. But the officers acknowledged that, 
other than the ostensible unlawful entry, they 
did not see anyone engaging in illegal 
conduct. Moreover, the activities they did 
observe—scantily clad women dancing, bills 
slipped into their garter belts, and people 
drinking—were consistent with Plaintiffs’ 
explanations that they were there for a 
bachelor or birthday party. To the extent that 
people scattered or hid when the police 
entered the house, such behavior may be 
“suggestive” of wrongdoing, but is not 
sufficient standing alone to create probable 
cause. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
124 (2000) (noting that unprovoked flight “is 
not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,” 
but is suggestive enough that, given other 
circumstances, may justify further 
investigation). To the extent that the party 
involved semi-nude dancing or stripping, it is 
hardly surprising that participants would 
retreat as officers entered off the street.   
 
As the district court explained, this is not a 
case in which “the property was boarded up, 
door latches were broken, no trespassing 
signs were posted or the manner of securing 
the property indicated that the owner wanted 
others to keep out.” Wesby v. District of 
Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 20, 33 (D.D.C. 
2012). Notwithstanding the parties’ dueling 
characterizations of how furnished and 
inhabited the house appeared, there is nothing 
in the record suggesting that the condition of 
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the house, on its own, should have alerted the 
Plaintiffs that they were unwelcome. To the 
contrary, that the house had sparse 
furnishings and functioning utilities was 
entirely consistent with one individual’s 
statement to Officer Parker that Peaches was 
the new tenant in a house previously 
occupied by the owner’s recently deceased 
grandfather.   
 
It bears emphasizing that Defendants are 
incorrect to suggest that our conclusion could 
render the unlawful-entry statute 
“unenforceable in most circumstances” or 
leave the police “powerless to make arrests 
for unlawful entry” in analogous situations. 
Br. for Appellants 24. The police were by no 
means powerless in this case. At a minimum, 
after speaking with Hughes and determining 
that he had not given Peaches permission to 
use the house, the officers could have told the 
Plaintiffs that they lacked permission to be 
there and so must leave. Had the officers 
“personally asked [the Plaintiffs] to leave and 
[the Plaintiffs] had refused,” such a refusal 
would have supplied the probable cause the 
officers needed to make an arrest for 
unlawful entry. District of Columbia v. 
Murphy, 631 A.2d 34, 38 (D.C. 1993); see id. 
at 37 (“The offense of unlawful entry 
includes . . . cases where a person who has 
entered the premises with permission 
subsequently refuses to leave after being 
asked to do so by someone lawfully in 
charge.”).  
 
In sum, when faced with the facts and 
circumstances presented in this case—and, in 
particular, without any evidence that the 
Plaintiffs knew or should have known they 
were in the house against the will of the 
owner or lawful occupant—a reasonable 
officer could not have believed there was 
probable cause to arrest the Plaintiffs for 
unlawful entry.   
 
Disorderly Conduct. Defendants argue in the 
alternative that the officers had probable 
cause to arrest the Plaintiffs for disorderly 
conduct. At the time of the Plaintiffs’ arrests, 
the relevant statute made it a crime to 
“shout[] or make[] a noise either outside or 
inside a building during the nighttime to the 
annoyance or disturbance of any considerable 
number of persons,” either with the intent “to 
provoke a breach of the peace, or under 
circumstances such that a breach of the peace 
may be occasioned thereby.” D.C. Code § 22-
1321(3) (2008). The “breach of the peace” 
clause qualifies the remainder of the statute 
“and sets forth an essential element of the 
offense.” In re T.L., 996 A.2d 805, 810 (D.C. 
2010).   
 
Plaintiffs point to the evidence in the record 
that the arresting officers themselves did not 
believe there was evidence to support a 
disorderly conduct charge. As long as the 
arresting officers “had an objectively valid 
ground upon which” to make an arrest, 
however, the subjective knowledge and 
intent of the officers is irrelevant. United 
States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 566 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002); see Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Thus, even where 
police do not believe evidence suffices, or are 
unsure which of several offenses the suspect 
may have committed, an arrest is valid so 
long as, on the facts of which the officers 
were aware, an objective observer can 
discern probable cause. See, e.g., United 
States v. Broadie, 452 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 
U.S. 146, 153 (2004)); Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 
at 566; United States v. Prandy-Binett, 995 
F.2d 1069, 1073-74 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see 
also Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.) (“[W]hen faced 
with a claim for false arrest, we focus on the 
validity of the arrest, and not on the validity 
of each charge.”). Defendants are thus 
correct that the arresting officers’ subjective 
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belief that they lacked probable cause to 
arrest the Plaintiffs for disorderly conduct is 
not dispositive. What matters is whether, on 
the facts the officers knew at the time, a 
reasonably prudent officer could have found 
that the Plaintiffs were engaging in disorderly 
conduct. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 
813; Bookhardt, 277 F.3d at 566.   
 
The officers here, however, accurately 
estimated the evidence as inadequate to 
support probable cause to believe that the 
Plaintiffs’ conduct was disorderly. As the 
district court recognized, some evidence 
suggested “the police were told of reports of 
a loud party or loud music and some officers 
heard loud music upon arrival.” Wesby, 841 
F. Supp. 2d at 34. But Defendants exaggerate 
the nature and quantum of that evidence as 
showing that Plaintiffs had “disturbed the 
tranquility and nighttime slumber of the 
community residents.” Br. for Appellants 32. 
The evidence on which Defendants rely 
shows nothing more than that one neighbor 
had called to complain about noise that 
evening. A disorderly conduct violation 
under District of Columbia law requires that 
an arrestee disturbed a “considerable number 
of persons” and acted “under circumstances 
such that a breach of the peace may” have 
been occasioned by that arrestee’s 19 
conduct. D.C. Code § 22-1321 (2008); In re 
T.L., 996 A.2d at 808-09 (concluding that 
defendant did not create “breach of the 
peace” within the meaning of the statute 
despite the fact that “some ten to fifteen 
people left their town houses” in order to 
observe the “clamor” that defendant caused 
by yelling loudly on the street). Even viewing 
it, as we must, in the light most favorable to 
the Defendants, the evidence here simply 
does not rise to that level.  
 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the 
officers lacked probable cause to arrest the 
Plaintiffs for unlawful entry or disorderly 
conduct.  
 
B.  
 
Having concluded that Plaintiffs’ arrests 
were unsupported by probable cause, we 
must consider whether qualified immunity 
shields the officers from liability. “An officer 
is entitled to qualified immunity, despite 
having engaged in constitutionally deficient 
conduct, if, in doing so, she did not violate 
‘clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.’” Brosseau v. 
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 205 (2004) 
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982)). If Officers Parker 
and Campanale had “an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that the facts 
and circumstances surrounding [Plaintiffs’] 
arrest were sufficient to establish probable 
cause,” Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 
1304 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)), they 
would be immune from Plaintiffs’ suit for 
damages.   
 
As with all cases examining whether a 
particular right was sufficiently clear, “[w]e 
begin by establishing the appropriate level of 
generality at which to analyze the right at 
issue.” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 528 
F.3d 969, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see, 
e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15 
(1999); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
639-40 (1987). Here, the question is whether, 
in light of clearly established law and the 
information that Officers Parker 
and Campanale had at the time, it was 
objectively reasonable for them to conclude 
that there was probable cause to believe 
Plaintiffs were engaging in either unlawful 
entry or disorderly conduct. See Wilson, 526 
U.S. at 615. This inquiry into the “objective 
legal reasonableness” of the officers’ actions 
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parallels but does not duplicate the 
reasonableness aspect of the Fourth 
Amendment probable cause 
analysis. See Johnson, 528 F.3d at 976 
(describing the two Saucier steps as “distinct 
but overlapping”).   
 
To determine whether the officers “strayed 
beyond clearly established bounds of 
lawfulness,” id., we look first to “cases of 
controlling authority,” Youngbey v. March, 
676 F.3d 1114, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617). It is not 
enough to reiterate that the Fourth 
Amendment’s restrictions against arrest 
without probable cause are clearly 
established; the inquiry must be made more 
contextually, at a finer level of specificity. At 
the same time, “[w]e need not identify cases 
with materially similar facts, but have only to 
show that the state of the law at the time of 
the incident gave the officer[s] fair warning” 
that their particular conduct was 
unconstitutional. Johnson, 528 F.3d at 976 
(brackets, ellipsis, and quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
Turning first to the claim of false arrest for 
unlawful entry, we conclude that no 
reasonable officer could have believed there 
was probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for 
entering unlawfully where, as here, there was 
uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiffs 
believed they had entered at the invitation of 
a lawful occupant. Defendants argue that, 
because no case identified by Plaintiffs had 
“invalidated an arrest for unlawful entry 
under similar circumstances,” it was not 
clearly established that arresting Plaintiffs for 
unlawful entry was unconstitutional. But that 
is not the applicable standard. Qualified 
immunity need not be granted every time 
police act unlawfully in a way that courts 
have yet to specifically address. See, 
e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (“To be 
established clearly, . . . there is no need that 
the very action in question have previously 
been held unlawful.” (brackets and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); Hope v. 
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) 
(“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their 
conduct violates established law even in 
novel factual circumstances.”).   
 
The law in this jurisdiction has been well 
established for decades that probable cause to 
arrest requires at least some evidence that the 
arrestee’s conduct meets each of the 
necessary elements of the offense that the 
officers believe supports arrest, including any 
state-of-mind element. See, e.g., Carr, 587 
F.3d at 410-11; Christian, 187 F.3d at 667. 
Under District of Columbia law, criminal 
intent is a necessary element of the offense of 
unlawful entry. A person who has a good 
purpose and bona fide belief of her right to 
enter “lacks the element of criminal intent 
required” to violate the unlawful-entry 
statute. Smith, 281 A.2d at 439. 
Notwithstanding Defendants’ suggestion to 
the contrary, see Oral Arg. Rec. at 5:40-5:52, 
District of Columbia unlawful entry law 
predating the conduct in this case plainly 
required that a suspect “knew or should have 
known that his entry was 
unwanted.” Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 308 
(collecting cases); see also id. at 307-08 
(explaining that, although “lack[ing] some 
precision,” prior discussions of “the mental 
states for entry and for doing so ‘against the 
will’ of the lawful occupant are both clearly 
discernible and distinct”).   
 
The controlling case law in this jurisdiction 
therefore made perfectly clear at the time of 
the events in this case that probable cause 
required some evidence that the Plaintiffs 
knew or should have known that they were 
entering against the will of the lawful owner. 
Defendants are simply incorrect to suggest 
that the officers could not have known that 
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uncontroverted evidence of an invitation to 
enter the premises would vitiate probable 
cause for unlawful entry. See Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 819 (“[A] reasonably competent 
public official should know the law 
governing his conduct.”).   
 
The same analysis holds true with respect to 
the clarity of the Fourth Amendment right 
against false arrest for disorderly conduct. 
Defendants contend that the law was not 
clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ 
arrests because there was no case law 
interpreting the specific provision of the 
statute on which Defendants rely. They 
correctly point out that the first case from the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
interpreting subsection (3) of D.C. Code § 
22-1321 was decided after the arrests in this 
case. See In re T.L., 996 A.2d at 810 (“This is 
the first prosecution under subsection (3) of 
the statute that has come to our attention.”). 
But the plain text of that provision requires 
the disturbance of a “considerable number of 
persons.” D.C. Code § 22-1321(3). Whatever 
a “considerable number of persons” means, 
surely it must mean something more than a 
single individual. And yet there is no 
evidence in this case that the loud music the 
officers heard when approaching the house 
disturbed anyone other than one neighbor 
who had complained.   
 
Put differently, we believe that the language 
of the disorderly conduct statute, standing 
alone, was sufficient to give fair notice that 
there was no probable cause to make an arrest 
under these circumstances. We do not doubt, 
as the In re T.L. court acknowledged, that 
some parts of that provision may “pose their 
own interpretive issues.” 996 A.2d at 810. 
That does not mean, however, that distinct 
elements of the offense were unclear in the 
absence of case law interpreting the statute. 
See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 
266-67 (1997) (analogizing clearly 
established standard to fair warning 
principles in the context of criminal 
prosecutions, and noting that “the touchstone 
is whether the statute, either standing alone or 
as construed, made it reasonably clear at the 
relevant time that the defendant’s conduct 
was criminal” (emphasis added)); 
cf. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 
(11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “the pertinent 
federal statute or federal constitutional 
provision in some cases will be specific 
enough to establish clearly the law applicable 
to particular conduct and circumstances and 
to overcome qualified immunity, even in the 
total absence of case law”).   
 
Finally, we reject Defendants’ arguments that 
Officers Parker and Campanale cannot be 
held liable under Section 1983 because (1) 
they followed Sergeant Suber’s order to 
arrest the Plaintiffs, and (2) they were not 
each individually responsible for each of the 
Plaintiffs’ arrests.   
 
An officer is not necessarily entitled to 
qualified immunity simply because he relies 
on a supervisor’s decision to arrest. In 
evaluating the objective legal reasonableness 
of an officer’s position for purposes of 
qualified immunity, approval by a superior 
officer is “pertinent” but not 
“dispositive.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 
132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012); cf. Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986) 
(rejecting the notion that approval of a 
warrant by a neutral magistrate automatically 
establishes qualified immunity, and requiring 
instead that the officer exercise his own 
“reasonable professional judgment”). 
Defendants argue to the contrary primarily in 
reliance on Elkins v. District of Columbia, 
690 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2012), in which we 
held that an inspector from the Historic 
Preservation Office, a government agency 
“charged with protecting the city’s historic 
structures,” was entitled to qualified 
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immunity for her unlawful seizure of the 
plaintiff’s notebooks. Id. at 559, 567- 68. 
Elkins held that, although the inspector had 
been personally involved in the 
unconstitutional seizure, it was reasonable 
for her not to know that her actions were 
unlawful. See id. at 568 (“The appropriate 
question for us to ask is whether it would 
have been clear to a reasonable official in [the 
inspector’s] situation that seizing [the 
plaintiff’s] notebook was unlawful.”). 
Significantly, the inspector in that case was 
not a law enforcement officer at all, but “a 
junior member of the search team present to 
take pictures in an inspection led by police 
and her superiors.” Id. Moreover, 
the Elkins court emphasized in granting 
qualified immunity that, although the 
inspector ultimately “relied upon the 
judgment of her supervisor and the police 
officer in charge,” she did not blindly follow 
their orders. Id. Rather, she first “asked 
[them] about the permissible scope of the 
search.” Id. Based on those and other factors, 
the court concluded that her actions, “though 
mistaken, were not unreasonable.” Id. 
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
244 (2009)).   
 
The circumstances here, unlike in Elkins, do 
not show the officers’ unquestioning reliance 
on Sergeant Suber’s arrest order to be 
reasonable. See id. at 569 (“Whether an 
official’s reliance [on her supervisor] is 
reasonable will always turn on several factors 
. . . .”). In contrast to the historic preservation 
investigator in Elkins, Officers Parker 
and Campanale are police officers with the 
independent authority to make arrests while 
on patrol. Indeed, had Sergeant Suber not 
come out to the scene, they would have had 
to make the arrest determinations on their 
own. Police officers charged with enforcing 
the criminal statutes are expected to know the 
limitations on their authority, see Harlow, 
457 U.S. at 819, and, as discussed above, a 
reasonably competent officer faced with the 
information the officers had gathered in this 
case should have known that he lacked 
probable cause to make an arrest.   
 
This is also not a case, like Elkins and the 
decisions cited therein, in which the 
defendant officers played little or no role in 
the investigation. See Elkins, 690 F.3d at 569 
(citing, by way of example, a case in which 
officers did not play a “key role in the overall 
investigation”). Here, Officers Parker 
and Campanale were actively involved in 
surveying the scene and gathering 
information regarding the Plaintiffs’ 
knowledge and reason for being in the house, 
and Officer Parker spoke to both Peaches and 
Hughes by phone. Both officers, moreover, 
were aware of the key uncontroverted facts in 
this case: that Peaches had invited the 
Plaintiffs to the house, and that the Plaintiffs 
had no reason to doubt that Peaches had the 
right to extend such an invitation. Under 
these circumstances, it was not reasonable for 
the officers to rely on 
Sergeant Suber’s unlawful decision to arrest 
the Plaintiffs. Yet another factor present in 
Elkins but missing in this case is that neither 
Officer Parker nor Officer Campanale raised 
the question—to Sergeant Suber or anyone 
else—whether there was evidence that the 
Plaintiffs knew or should have known that 
their presence in the house was unauthorized. 
Indeed, there is no evidence in the record 
suggesting that Officer Parker or 
Officer Campanale in fact disagreed with 
Sergeant Suber’s determination that there 
was probable cause for an arrest but carried 
out the arrests because they were under 
orders to do so.   
That the officers were apparently as confused 
or uninformed about the law as their 
supervisor does not make it reasonable for 
them to have arrested the Plaintiffs in reliance 
on his flawed assessment. Cf. Malley, 475 
U.S. at 346 n.9 (“The officer . . . cannot 
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excuse his own default by pointing to the 
greater incompetence of the 
magistrate.”); Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 
1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (2012) (“[W]hat we said in 
Malley about a magistrate’s authorization 
applies still more strongly to the approval of 
other police officers . . . .”). This Court has 
never held that qualified immunity permits an 
officer to escape liability for his 
unconstitutional conduct simply by invoking 
the defense that he was “just following 
orders.” See generally Hobson v. Wilson, 737 
F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (statement 
denying petition for rehearing) (per curiam) 
(rejecting with “no hesitation” the 
defendants’ argument, raised for the first time 
in petition for rehearing, that the existence of 
an illegal policy excused low-level 
government officials from liability). Indeed, 
“[i]n its most extreme form, this argument 
amounts to the contention that obedience to 
higher authority should excuse disobedience 
to law, no matter how central the law is to the 
preservation of citizens’ rights.” Id. For good 
reason, this Court has never adopted such a 
rule.   
 
That leaves us with the contention that 
Officers Parker and Campanale cannot be 
held liable because they did not personally 
arrest each of the Plaintiffs. But Defendants’ 
argument misapprehends the applicable legal 
standard for causation in the Section 1983 
context. As this court has recognized, the 
Plaintiffs were required to “produce evidence 
‘that each [officer], through [his] own 
individual actions, has violated the 
Constitution.’” Elkins, 690 F.3d at 564 
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 
(2009)). Here, the cause of the group arrest 
was the investigation and erroneous 
determination regarding probable cause. 
Both Officers Parker and Campanale were 
the hub of that investigation: they gathered 
evidence, including photographs of the 
people in the house, and actively participated 
in questioning the Plaintiffs and other key 
witnesses such as Hughes and Peaches. See 
id. at 566-68 (assessing whether the evidence 
showed that the individual officers caused the 
unlawful seizure, and noting in one instance 
that the defendant’s actions were 
“instrumental to the seizure”). In this context, 
that is sufficient to establish causation. See, 
e.g., KRL v. Estate of Moore, 512 F.3d 1184, 
1193 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying qualified 
immunity to an officer who relied on a 
facially invalid warrant in conducting a 
search because he played “an integral role in 
the overall investigation” that led to the 
issuance of the defective warrant); Hall v. 
Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147, 1154 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing general rule that mere presence 
is insufficient to create liability, but 
upholding denial of qualified immunity based 
on record evidence that the officer had been 
“the prime mover” in obtaining the search 
warrant and “participated in the search once 
inside the dwelling” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 
834, 837 (5th Cir. 1990) (officers who did not 
physically perform pat-down but who 
“remained armed on the premises throughout 
the entire search” could be held liable under 
Section 1983 as “participants rather than 
bystanders”).   
 
Because the common-law privilege 
Defendants invoke overlaps with but is 
harder to establish than qualified immunity, 
the Defendants’ argument on that score “fails 
for essentially the same reasons already set 
forth.” District of Columbia v. Minor, 740 
A.2d 523, 531 (D.C. 1999) (noting that the 
standard for common-law privilege 
“resembles the section 1983 probable cause 
and qualified immunity standards . . . (with 
the added clear articulation of the 
requirement of good faith)”); cf. Bradshaw v. 
District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 318, 323 (D.C. 
2012) (explaining that 28 although the officer 
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“need not demonstrate probable cause in the 
constitutional sense” for privilege to attach, 
the officer must show “(1) he or she believed, 
in good faith, that his or her conduct was 
lawful, and (2) this belief was reasonable” 
(brackets and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm the district 
court’s judgment insofar as it relates to 
Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 and common-law 
false arrest claims.  
  
III.  
 
Finally, we address the District’s claim that 
the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment to the Plaintiffs on their common-
law negligent supervision claim. The District 
makes two arguments in support of its 
contention that the district court erred. First, 
the District contends that the negligent 
supervision claim must fail because the 
arrests were supported by probable cause, so 
either the standard of care was met or there 
was no underlying tort. That argument, 
however, is foreclosed by our conclusion that 
the officers lacked probable cause to arrest 
the Plaintiffs.   
 
Second, the District argues that it was entitled 
to summary judgment on this claim because 
the Plaintiffs failed to present expert 
testimony regarding the standard of care. We 
disagree. District of Columbia law requires 
expert testimony only where “the subject in 
question is so distinctly related to some 
science, profession or occupation as to be 
beyond the ken of the average 
layperson.” Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 
569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting District of 
Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427, 
433 (D.C. 2000)). Moreover, although the 
District correctly points out that courts often 
require expert testimony where the training 
and supervision of police officers is 
concerned, see Br. for Appellants 43 (citing 
cases), the fact that the supervising official 
was on the scene and directed the officers to 
make the unlawful arrests distinguishes this 
case from those in which expert testimony 
has been required. See Godfrey, 559 F.3d at 
573 (no expert testimony required where “the 
individual with supervisory 
authority (Iverson) was present when his 
employee (his personal bodyguard Kane) 
committed the tortious acts”); District of 
Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 788, 797 (D.C. 
2010) (no expert testimony required where 
police sergeants were on the scene and 
authorized arrest without inquiring into 
“critical information” about the incident).   
 
Indeed, the undisputed facts in this case 
demonstrate that Sergeant Suber, one of the 
District’s supervisory officials, directed his 
subordinates to make an arrest that he should 
have known was unsupported by probable 
cause. That is sufficient to entitle the 
Plaintiffs to judgment as a matter of law on 
their negligent supervision claim. See Phelan 
v. City of Mount Rainier, 805 A.2d 930, 937-
38 (D.C. 2002) (“To establish a cause of 
action for negligent supervision, a plaintiff 
must show: that the employer knew or should 
have known its employee behaved in a 
dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, 
and that the employer, armed with that actual 
or constructive knowledge, failed to 
adequately supervise the employee.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 
* * *  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
district court’s judgment.  
 
So ordered.  
BROWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:   
 
The court today articulates a broad new 
rule—one that essentially removes most 
species of unlawful entry from the criminal 
code. Officers must prove individuals 
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occupying private property know their entry 
is unauthorized; otherwise police lack 
probable cause to make arrests. Moreover, 
any plausible explanation resolves the 
question of culpability in the suspects’ favor. 
Thus, unless the property is posted with signs 
or boarded up and attempts to prevent access 
have been deliberately breached, i.e., there is 
direct evidence of unauthorized entry, law 
enforcement’s options are limited to politely 
asking any putative invitee to leave.   
 
I respectfully dissent.   
 
I  
 
Summary resolution is inappropriate 
where—as here— the probable cause 
determination turns on close questions of 
credibility, as well as the reasonability of 
inferences regarding culpable states of mind 
that officers draw from a complicated factual 
context. See Media Gen., Inc. v. Tomlin, 387 
F.3d 865, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[Where] the 
material facts are susceptible to divergent 
inferences . . . the [] Court ha[s] no basis upon 
which to grant summary judgment.”).  
 
The Court concludes that, as a matter of law, 
no reasonably prudent officer could believe 
Plaintiffs entered unlawfully because the 
undisputed evidence shows an individual 
with (illusory) authority invited their entry, 
vitiating Plaintiffs’ formation of the requisite 
intent. Maj. Op. at 11. Yet the mere presence 
of an invitation by one with ostensible 
authority is not dispositive if, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the officers 
could still conclude the suspects knew or 
reasonably should have known their 
invitation was against the will of the lawful 
owner. See Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 
at 308 (D.C. 2013). The absence of direct, 
affirmative proof of a culpable mental state is 
not the same thing as undisputed evidence of 
innocence.   
 
The court relies on two primary precedents to 
raise the bar, but neither Ortberg v. United 
States, 81 A.3d 303 (D.C. 2013) nor United 
States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) justifies the impossible standard for 
finding probable cause the court now 
proposes. Channeling Dr. Frankenstein, the 
court cobbles together a few recognizable 
parts to build a grotesque and unnatural 
whole. In Ortberg, the court recognized a 
bona fide belief in the right to enter as a 
defense to a charge of unlawful 
entry. Ortberg was not a probable cause case; 
it confirmed that all elements of unlawful 
entry, including requisite criminal intent, are 
necessary to sustain a conviction, while 
emphasizing that bona fide belief must have 
some reasonable basis. It is “not sufficient 
that an accused merely claim a belief of a 
right to enter.” Id. at 309, n.12.   
 
United States v. Christian does impose a 
higher probable cause standard but that case 
is distinguishable. First, Christian involved a 
specific intent crime. See generally Gasho v. 
United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“[A]n officer need not have probable 
cause for every element of an offense[,]. . . 
however, when specific intent is a required 
element of the offense, the arresting officer 
must have probable cause for that element.”). 
Second, Christian did not require direct 
evidence. The court cited Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972), acknowledging 
that the circumstances surrounding an arrest 
may support the necessary inference of 
unlawful possession. Christian, 187 F.3d at 
406. The problem with the government’s 
argument in Christian was not the absence of 
direct proof of criminal intent, it was the 
absence of any evidence whatsoever 
of unlawful possession. “[T]he officers 
[therefore] lacked probable cause to believe a 
crime had been committed.” Id.   
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Today’s decision undercuts the ability of 
officers to arrest suspects in the absence of 
direct, affirmative proof of a culpable mental 
state; proof that must exceed a nebulous but 
heightened sufficiency burden that the Court 
declines to specify. The Court’s decision 
broadly extends Ortberg and Christian to 
apply standards designed for materially 
disparate contexts to the probable cause 
inquiry for general intent crimes. Cf. Pierce 
v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237, 1246 n.2 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Sentences out of context 
rarely mean what they seem to say.”). As a 
result, the Court finds officers may only 
lawfully arrest suspects for unlawful entry 
where the officers have evidence 
affirmatively proving each element of an 
offense, including clear proof of what the 
suspect knew or reasonably should have 
known. But cf. 1 Corinthians 2:11 (“For who 
knows a person’s thoughts except their own 
spirit within them?”). This is tantamount to 
an invitation to abuse vacation rentals or 
houses being marketed for sale or lease where 
prospective tenants can gain entry and retain 
or misappropriate a key or a lockbox 
combination, or leave a point of entry 
unsecured. Such a heightened threshold is not 
called for under our precedents. For general 
intent crimes, “[p]robable cause does not 
require the same type of specific evidence of 
each element of the offense as would be 
needed to support a conviction,” Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). The 
proper inquiry is not whether the element of 
knowledge was conclusively satisfied; it is 
instead whether, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, officers could reasonably 
believe Plaintiffs committed the offense of 
unlawful entry.   
The Court concludes there was insufficient 
evidence to support arrest because the 
evidence that Plaintiffs were invitees was 
uncontradicted, noting the presence of semi-
nude dancing and the semi-furnished state of 
the home are consistent with Plaintiffs’ 
contentions of their innocent attendance at a 
party. Maj. Op. at 15–16. A jury might credit 
Plaintiffs’ depiction of events, their claims of 
innocent reliance upon a credible invitation, 
and conclude they lacked knowledge of the 
unlawfulness of their entry. However, for 
purposes of summary judgment, Plaintiffs’ 
lack of knowledge must not be merely 
“consistent” with the evidence gathered by 
the police. Instead, Plaintiffs’ lack of 
knowledge must be the only reasonable 
inference the officers could draw.   
 
Here the totality of the circumstances could 
cause reasonable minds to question whether 
Plaintiffs were as blameless as the attendees 
of a Sunday brunch whose imprudent host 
has overstayed her lease. Contra Maj. Op. at 
13 (finding this case indistinguishable from 
such a scenario). The officers responded to a 
call reporting illegal activity in a home at 
least some residents of the neighborhood 
knew to be vacant. As the officers entered, 
the partygoers’ first response was to scatter 
into different rooms or hide. The house’s 
interior was bare and in disarray; beyond 
fixtures or large appliances, it contained only 
folding chairs and food, and one room 
upstairs had a bare mattress and lighted 
candles—along with “females . . . that had 
provocative clothing on with money in . . . 
their garter belt[s].” Parker Dep. 14:12–16.  
 
After rounding up and interviewing the 
partygoers, the officers found their claim to 
lawful entry was an invitation from the 
house’s supposed tenant, Peaches, who was 
“throwing a party.” However, Peaches was 
not actually present when the officers arrived 
on the scene. The partygoers also gave 
inconsistent explanations for the party to 
which they had allegedly been invited. Some 
claimed to be attending a birthday party while 
others insisted it was a bachelor’s party; in 
any event, none could identify the guest of 
honor.   
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When ultimately reached by telephone, 
Peaches admitted to inviting various 
partygoers, and claimed she had permission 
to enter, an assertion she quickly recanted in 
a series of conflicting answers she made to 
investigators before becoming evasive and 
hanging up. The officers also confirmed from 
the actual owner that the house had been 
vacant since its last resident’s death, the 
current owner was attempting to rent the 
property out, and neither Peaches nor anyone 
else had the owner’s permission to enter or 
use the premises.   
 
The totality of the evidence does not need to 
show the officers’ beliefs regarding the 
unlawfulness of Plaintiffs’ entry were 
“correct or more true than false. A practical, 
nontechnical probability . . . is all that is 
required.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 
(1983). The surrounding context may not 
convince a jury to find probable cause. But 
likewise, taken in the light most favorable to 
the officers, the facts are not so clear cut that 
no reasonable officer could believe the 
partygoers knew or should have known 
Peaches’ invitation was not credible or that 
their entry into the home was not properly 
authorized.   
 
This is not a case where officers “turn[ed] a 
blind eye toward potentially exculpatory 
evidence in an effort to pin a crime on 
someone.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 
372 (6th Cir. 1999). Nor did officers lack 
“any” evidence Plaintiffs committed the 
offense of unlawful entry. See Christian, 187 
F.3d at 667. The circumstances surrounding 
the arrest were sufficient to support the 
inference that the suspects knew or 
reasonably should have known their entry 
was unlawful.  
 
“[T]he real key . . . [to probable cause] is how 
[an] observed transaction fits into the totality 
of the circumstances.” Jefferson v. United 
States, 906 A.2d 885, 888 (D.C. 2006) 
(noting observation of a one-way transfer of 
an unidentified object can, in some cases, 
support probable cause for an unlawful two-
way exchange of drugs for money). The 
officers did not ignore Plaintiffs’ potentially 
exculpatory claims of invitation. See Fridley 
v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 874–75 (6th Cir. 
2002) (officers may not ignore exculpatory 
facts that tend to negate an element of an 
offense). Instead, during the course of a fast-
moving investigation, officers considered 
and investigated Plaintiffs’ statements, and 
rendered a determination that their claims of 
bona fide good faith were insufficiently 
credible to overcome the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. See Minch v. D.C., 952 
A.2d 929, 937–38 (D.C. 2008) (noting police 
suspicion was reasonably based on 
appellant’s evasiveness and equivocation, 
particularly in a fast-moving investigation).   
 
The very purpose of a totality of the 
circumstances inquiry is to allow law 
enforcement officers to approach such 
ambiguous facts and self-interested or 
unreliable statements with an appropriately 
healthy dose of skepticism, and decline to 
give credence to evidence the officers deem 
unreliable under the circumstances. 
Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 
(1983) (“In making a determination of 
probable cause the relevant inquiry is not 
whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or 
‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that 
attaches to particular types of non-criminal 
acts.”). The Court’s holding to the contrary 
ensures that all but the most implausible 
claims of invitation must be credited and 
radically narrows the capacity of officers to 
use their experience and prudent judgment to 
assess the credibility of the self-interested 
statements of intruders who claim to have 
been “invited” and have not overtly forced 
their entry into a home.   
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In light of the facts known to the officers at 
the time of the arrests, summary judgment is 
unwarranted on the question of probable 
cause for unlawful entry. From their 
investigation, the officers knew the house 
was an unoccupied private rental dwelling, 
which would likely not require a sign or 
express warning forbidding entry. 
See McGloin v. United States, 232 A.2d 90, 
91 (D.C. 1967). They further determined 
none of the Plaintiffs owned or rented the 
house; that the property was, in fact, vacant; 
and the true owner had provided neither the 
partygoers nor any tenants with permission to 
enter, see Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 
1174, 1177 n.4 (D.C. 1985) (“[T]he arresting 
officers’ knowledge that the property is 
vacant and closed to the public is material to 
a determination of probable cause.”). 
Plaintiffs’ party was taking place in a home 
so sparsely furnished as to be consistent with 
a vacant building; the guests’ immediate 
response to the presence of police was to run 
and hide, an action suggestive of 
consciousness of guilt; the partygoers gave 
conflicting accounts about “why” the party 
was being held; and they purported to rely on 
an invitation from a “tenant” who was not 
actually present. When reached by telephone 
the “tenant” gave conflicting accounts as to 
her own permission to access the home, 
finally admitted she lacked any right to use 
the house, and—upon further questioning—
became evasive and yelled at officers before 
hanging up.   
 
Based on this evidence, taken in the light 
most favorable to the officers, a reasonable 
person could disbelieve Plaintiffs’ claim of 
innocent entry based on a credible 
invitation. See Parsons v. U.S., 15 A.3d 276, 
280 (D.C. 2011) (“[T]he informant’s general 
credibility and the reliability of the 
information he or she provides are important 
factors in a probable cause assessment”); see 
also United States v. Project on Gov’t 
Oversight, 454 F.3d 306, 313 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (“Evaluation of the credibility of 
witnesses must be left to the factfinder, and 
the need to assess the credibility of witnesses 
is precisely what places this dispute outside 
the proper realm of summary judgment.”). A 
rational juror could find the officers 
reasonably believed Plaintiffs either knew, or 
should have known, Peaches’ invitation was 
unauthorized and that use of the house was 
not otherwise permissible.   
 
At its fringes probable cause is a nebulous 
construct. See Jefferson v. United States, 906 
A.2d 885, 887 (D.C. 2006). (“The probable-
cause standard is incapable of precise 
definition . . . because it deals with 
probabilities and depends on the totality of 
the circumstances.”). In factually complex 
circumstances, like the present one, the 
probable cause inquiry requires weighing the 
credibility of statements from multiple 
parties and witnesses, and consideration of 
the reasonable inferences officers may draw 
from idiosyncratic facts. Resolution of such a 
credibility laden and fact specific inquiry is 
properly reserved for the jury. The Court errs 
in concluding such a case is appropriate for 
preliminary resolution at summary judgment. 
See George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 413 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]t the summary 
judgment stage, a judge may not make 
credibility determinations, weigh the 
evidence, or draw inferences from the facts-
these are jury functions, not those of a judge 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . 
. Although a jury may ultimately decide to 
credit the version of the events described 
by [a defendant] over that offered by [a 
plaintiff], this is not a basis upon which a 
court may rest in granting a motion for 
summary judgment.”).   
 
More troubling still, by subverting the 
appropriate standard for probable cause, the 
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Court effectively excises unlawful entry from 
the District’s criminal code for cases where 
intruders claim they were invited and have 
not obviously and forcibly obtained entrance 
to a currently unoccupied private dwelling. 
Such a conclusion is not compelled by either 
our case law or common sense; officers are 
simply not required to credit the exonerating 
statements of suspected wrongdoers where 
the totality of the circumstances suggests 
such claims should be treated with 
skepticism. 
   
II  
 
Even assuming Plaintiffs’ arrests were not 
supported by adequate probable cause for 
unlawful entry, qualified immunity shields 
the officers from individual liability for 
Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims because the 
officers’ “conduct [did] not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have 
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982) (emphasis added); see 
also DeGraff v. D.C., 120 F.3d 298, 302 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he scope of qualified 
immunity must be evaluated using the [] 
‘objective reasonableness’ criteria.”).   
 
For purposes of qualified immunity, 
“‘[c]learly established’ . . . means that “[t]he 
contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable [officer] would 
understand that what he is doing violates that 
right.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-
15 (1999). While, “[t]his is not to say that an 
official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question 
has been previously held unlawful,” id., 
courts should nonetheless “examine the 
asserted right at a relatively high level of 
specificity, and on a fact-specific, case-by-
case basis,” O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 
F.3d 662, 668 (6th Cir. 2011). And in 
reviewing the pre-existing law, the officers’ 
“unlawfulness must be apparent” to support a 
finding that qualified immunity does not 
apply. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615; Wardlaw v. 
Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(suggesting the “unlawfulness of the 
defendants [must be] so apparent that no 
reasonable officer could have believed in the 
lawfulness of his actions”).  
 
Here the pre-existing law of unlawful entry is 
not so clear that a reasonable officer would 
have known he lacked probable cause to 
arrest Plaintiffs. The officers were faced with 
an unusual factual scenario, not well 
represented in the controlling case law. The 
property where Plaintiffs were found was 
somewhere between an occupied private 
dwelling and a vacant or abandoned building. 
The situation the officers encountered rests 
uneasily between two distinct strands of 
District law. Compare McGloin, 232 A.2d at 
91 (“[N]o one would contend that one may 
lawfully enter a private dwelling house 
simply because there is no sign or warning 
forbidding entry.”) with Culp, 486 A.2d at 
1177 (noting boarded windows gives 
sufficient warning an abandoned building 
should not be entered). 
 
Neither line of cases unambiguously 
controls. The law of unlawful entry for 
abandoned properties has traditionally dealt 
with obviously decrepit buildings, e.g., Culp, 
486 A.2d 11 at 1175 (noting the house was 
missing a rear door, its windows were 
shattered, and the interior was in 
“shambles”), while unlawful entry of private 
dwellings has generally dealt with 
traditionally occupied residences, 
apartments, or semipublic buildings. See, 
e.g., McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91; Bowman v. 
United States, 212 A.2d 610, 611-12 (D.C. 
1963). Neither line of cases encompasses a 
scenario where individuals claim to be the 
social guests of a tenant of a (vacant) property 
to which the tenant has no actual possessory 
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interest—much less a scenario where the 
putative tenant is herself not present on the 
scene and refuses to otherwise cooperate with 
officers’ ongoing investigation. Moreover, to 
the extent the pre-existing law is broadly 
comparable, a reasonable person could find it 
supports an officer’s finding of probable 
cause where a trespassers claim of invitation 
is deemed insufficiently credible. See, 
e.g., McGloin, 232 A.2d at 90–91 (upholding 
the conviction of person found in nonpublic 
areas of a private apartment building, despite 
his excuse he was looking for a cat or a friend 
who lived in the building); Kozlovska v. 
United States, 30 A.3d 799, 800–801 (D.C. 
2011) (upholding the conviction of a woman 
who claimed an employee permitted her to 
use the building).   
 
Thus, in the absence of pre-existing case law 
clearly establishing the contours of Plaintiffs’ 
rights, the officers were shielded by qualified 
immunity when, acting under color of state 
law, they reasonably arrested plaintiffs for 
unlawful entry. The case law of course 
requires officers to have some evidence the 
alleged trespassers committed the offense of 
unlawful entry. See Maj. Op. at 21–22. Yet 
nothing in the District’s law requires officers 
to credit the statement of the intruders 
regarding their own purportedly innocent 
mental state where the surrounding facts and 
circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of 
such claims. The officers were therefore 
entitled to the protection of qualified 
immunity and the “breathing room” it gives 
them to make reasonable— albeit potentially 
mistaken—judgments under novel 
circumstances unexplored by the law when 
they took the challenged action. Ashcroft v. 
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).  
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“Supreme Court to hear case about arrests at party in D.C. house” 
 
Robert Barnes 
Washington Post 
January 19, 2017 
 
The party in the otherwise quiet Washington 
neighborhood had gotten loud by the time 
D.C. police officers Andre Parker and 
Anthony Campanale arrived. 
Several women were dressed only in bras and 
thongs, with money in their garter belts. The 
unoccupied residence in Anacostia appeared 
to have been turned into a strip club, the 
officers thought. The partygoers said they 
had been invited by a woman named 
“Peaches,” although some knew her as 
“Tasty.” In the end, Parker and Campanale 
arrested 21 people. 
The legal wrangling that followed those 
arrests in 2008 resulted in a nearly $1 million 
award against the officers and the city, and 
divided the judges of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On Thursday, 
the case made it onto the Supreme Court’s 
docket. 
The court announced that it will consider 
whether there was probable cause for the 
officers to make the arrests — the partygoers 
said they were invited to the house, and they 
were never prosecuted — and whether the 
officers deserve immunity for their actions. 
The case appears to have split the Supreme 
Court justices. They considered nine times 
whether to accept the case before agreeing to 
review it. 
It is unclear whether it will be considered in 
the court’s current term or held over for the 
term that begins in October. 
D.C. Attorney General Karl A. Racine told 
the justices in a petition that the court of 
appeals decision — finding that the officers 
lacked probable cause for the arrests because 
the partygoers said they were not trespassing 
but were guests of Peaches — failed to reflect 
“the real world in which police officers 
function.” 
“The court of appeals’ decision undercuts an 
officer’s ability to use his or her experience, 
judgment, and direct observations to assess 
the credibility of a suspect’s innocent 
explanation,” Racine wrote. “Officers will 
second-guess themselves and forgo 
enforcement of the law, fearing that a judge, 
far removed from the scene and years later, 
might make a different credibility judgment 
and then hold them personally liable.” 
Sixteen of the 21 people arrested sued after 
no charges were brought. A district judge 
ruled against the police officers, saying that 
“nothing about what the police learned at the 
scene suggests that the [partygoers] knew or 
should have known that they were entering” 
against the property owner’s will. 
After a trial, the partygoers were awarded 
$680,000 and the police officers were 
ordered to pay attorney costs, which brought 
the total to just under $1 million. 
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A divided panel of the appeals court upheld 
the award. And two judicial heavyweights on 
the court, liberal Cornelia T.L. Pillard and 
conservative Brett M. Kavanaugh, squared 
off over whether the entire circuit should 
review the decision. 
Kavanaugh said the panel’s opinion eroded 
the protection for police officers who may 
make an honest mistake when trying to carry 
out their duties. 
“Two D.C. police officers have been held 
liable for a total of almost $1 million,” 
Kavanaugh said in a statement joined by 
three other judges who wanted to rehear the 
case. “That equates to about 20 years of after-
tax income for the officers, not to mention the 
harm to their careers. For what? For arresting 
for trespassing a group of people who were 
partying late at night with drugs and strippers 
in a vacant house that the partiers did not own 
or rent.” 
But Pillard replied that the panel’s opinion 
did not change existing protections for police 
officers at all. 
“Our opinion does not ignore or weaken that 
important protection, which gives officers the 
necessary ‘breathing room’ to perform their 
difficult, dangerous jobs and safeguard the 
public,” she said. “It simply finds that a 
reasonable officer could not conclude, based 
on the information before these particular 
officers, that there was probable cause.” 
Ted J. Williams, an attorney for Theodore 
Wesby and the others who were arrested, had 
told the Supreme Court that it did not warrant 
the justices’ attention. 
Under D.C. law, a person is guilty of 
unlawful entry only if he knew or should have 
known that he was entering the property 
“against the will of the lawful occupant or of 
the person lawfully in charge” of the 
property, Williams wrote. In this case, the 
partygoers had been invited by Peaches, “a 
woman whom they reasonably believed to be 
its lawful occupant.” 
The case is District of Columbia v. Wesby.
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“Supreme Court to hear case about party in vacant DC house” 
 
Associated Press 
Mark Sherman 
January 19, 2017 
 
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme 
Court will hear a case in which people 
arrested for having a party in a vacant house 
sued police for violating their constitutional 
rights and won. 
The justices said Thursday they will review 
lower court rulings in favor of 16 people who 
gathered in a house in Washington about 
three miles east of the nation’s Capitol for a 
party. 
Police arrested the group after no one could 
identify whose house it was, some said it was 
a birthday party and others said it was a 
bachelor party. No one could identify the 
guest of honor. Several women were scantily 
clad, with money hanging out of their garter 
belts. The officers said that the scene 
resembled a strip club, according to court 
papers. 
Several of the partygoers said someone 
named “Peaches” gave them permission to 
have the party. 
But when an officer later contacted the 
purported owner of the home, he denied 
having given anyone permission to have a 
party. 
The group was arrested for trespassing, a 
charge later changed to disorderly conduct 
and then dropped altogether. But the 16 
people sued for false arrest and were awarded 
$680,000. 
The issue for the court is whether the officers 
had sufficient reason to arrest the group for 
trespassing. The court also will determine 
whether the officers should be shielded from 
liability even if their actions are found to 
violate the law. 
A panel of the federal appeals court in 
Washington upheld the judgment, but four 
other judges on the court said that the officers 
should have been protected, citing a string of 
Supreme Court decisions. 
The case, District of Columbia v. Wesby, 15-
1485, will be argued in April or the fall. 
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“Chemerinsky: When can government officers be held liable?” 
 
ABA Journal 
Erwin Chemerinsky 
February 2, 2017 
 
In the last few years, police killings of 
unarmed African-American men—Michael 
Brown, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Laquan 
McDonald, Freddie Gray and others—have 
received great publicity. There is an urgent 
question of how to hold the police 
accountable to prevent and remedy 
constitutional violations. 
This term, the Supreme Court has several 
cases addressing when law enforcement 
officers can be sued for money damages. 
In each of the cases, the court has to consider 
whether the police violated the Fourth 
Amendment and if so, whether the officers 
can be held liable or whether they are 
protected by “qualified immunity.” All 
government officials when sued for money 
damages can raise immunity as a defense. For 
some tasks, there is “absolute immunity,” 
which means that the officer cannot be held 
liable no matter how egregious the 
constitutional violation. For example, 
absolute immunity exists for prosecutors for 
their prosecutorial tasks, legislators for their 
legislative tasks, judges for their judicial 
tasks and law enforcement officers for their 
testimony in court. 
If there is not absolute immunity, a 
government official can assert “qualified 
immunity.” The Supreme Court has said that 
this means that the officer can be held liable 
only if he or she violates clearly established 
law that every reasonable officer should 
know; it must be a right that is established 
“beyond dispute.” In many recent cases, the 
Court has found that police sued for 
excessive force are protected by qualified 
immunity. For example, on January 9, 
in White v. Pauley, the Supreme Court, in a 
per curium opinion, reversed the Denver-
based 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and 
held that officers were protected by qualified 
immunity for a shooting that killed a man in 
his home. 
There are several pending cases that will 
cause the court to examine when law 
enforcement officers can be held liable. 
Ziglar v. Abbasi, Ashcroft v. Abbasi, Hasty 
v. Abbasi 
These three cases, which were consolidated 
for oral arguments, involve Muslim men who 
were apprehended and detained after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. They 
were then held for months in solitary 
confinement in a super-maximum security 
wing of a federal prison. They claim that they 
were subjected to harassment and abuse. 
They maintain that this was not because of 
any evidence that they were dangerous, but 
solely because of their race and ethnicity. 
The Manhattan-based 2nd U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims 
survived a motion to dismiss. The Supreme 
Court granted review and there are several 
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issues before the court. Do the plaintiffs have 
a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics (1971), which held that federal 
officers can be sued for money damages for 
violating the Constitution? Unlike 42 U.S.C. 
§1983, which allows state and local officers 
to be sued for violating the Constitution and 
federal laws, there is no similar statute 
authorizing suits against federal 
officials. Bivens held that a cause of action 
for money damages can be derived from the 
Constitution, in that case from the Fourth 
Amendment. But the court repeatedly has 
narrowed Bivens and there is the question of 
whether plaintiffs have a claim for money 
damages in this situation. 
Also, there is the question of qualified 
immunity. Even if there is a cause of action, 
did the defendants violate clearly established 
law that every reasonable officer should 
know? Finally, there is the question of 
whether the plaintiffs’ complaint was 
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss in 
light of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case with similar 
facts. The plaintiffs in these cases amended 
their complaint after Ashcroft v. Iqbal and 
maintain that the additional, detailed facts are 
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 
The cases were argued on Jan. 18 of this year. 
Only six justices are participating. Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor is recused, likely because 
the cases were before the 2nd Circuit when 
she was a judge there, and Justice Elena 
Kagan, is recused, likely because she the 
Solicitor General of the United States when 
the cases were considered there. 
Hernandez v. Mesa 
In 2010, a 15-year-old boy, Sergio 
Hernandez, was playing with three friends in 
the concrete culvert separating El Paso, 
Texas, and Juarez, Mexico. They were 
playing a game where they would run up the 
culvert’s northern incline, touch the U.S. 
fence, and then scamper back down to the 
bottom. They were unarmed. A border agent, 
Jesus Mesa, fired his gun at Hernandez, who 
was about 60 feet away. Hernandez was 
struck by the bullet and killed. Mesa was in 
the United States; Hernandez was in Mexico. 
Whether the boys were throwing rocks at 
Mesa, and whether there was “alien 
smuggling” occurring, is very much in 
dispute between the parties. 
The federal district court dismissed all claims 
and the New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed. There are a 
number of issues before the Supreme Court. 
Does the Fourth Amendment, which 
prohibits excessive force by law enforcement 
officials, apply? In United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez (1990), the court held that the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to law 
enforcement officials acting outside of the 
United States. Does that apply here when 
Mesa was in the United States when he fired 
his gun, but the victim was on the other side 
of the border? Also, like in the Abassi cases, 
there are questions of whether there is a cause 
of action under Bivens and, if so, whether the 
defendants are protected by qualified 
immunity. 
The plaintiff presents this to the court as 
applying settled law: the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits excessive force by a law 
enforcement officer in the United States and 
Mesa was in the United States when he fired 
his gun. The defendant argues that this is a 
case about extraterritoriality and the Fourth 
Amendment doesn’t apply, or at the very 
least a novel situation where there should not 
be a Bivens suit available and qualified 
immunity should be a defense. Hernandez v. 
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Mesa will be argued on Tuesday, February 
21. 
District of Columbia v. Wesby 
On Jan. 19, the Supreme Court granted 
review in yet another Fourth Amendment 
case with a qualified immunity issue: District 
of Columbia v. Wesby. 
Police officers found late-night partiers 
inside a vacant home. Some of the partiers 
told the officers that they had been invited to 
the house by a woman whom they believed to 
be its lawful occupant. That woman 
confirmed to the officers by telephone that 
she had invited them. The officers, however, 
subsequently learned that she was not in fact 
a lawful resident of the house. The officers 
arrested the partiers for trespassing. 
Ultimately, all of the charges were dismissed 
and 16 individuals filed a civil suit against the 
officers under §1983 for violating the Fourth 
Amendment. The federal district court and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of 
the plaintiffs, holding that there was not 
probable cause for their arrest because the 
partiers reasonably believed that they had the 
right to present in the house and also 
concluding that the officers were not 
protected by qualified immunity. 
The Supreme Court granted review on two 
questions: whether the officers had probable 
cause to arrest under these circumstances and 
whether even if there was no probable cause 
to arrest the apparent trespassers, the officers 
were entitled to qualified immunity. No oral 
argument date has been scheduled. 
All of these cases come to the court in the 
context of great national attention to police 
misconduct and the demands for action by 
Black Lives Matter and others. Together 
these cases will be important in defining the 
ability to use civil suits to hold the police 
accountable. 
